[1996] 1 F.C. 771
T-1941-93
James L. Ferguson (Plaintiff)
v.
Arctic Transportation Ltd. and the Owners and all Others Interested in the Ships AMT Transporter, Arctic Nutsukpok, Arctic Immerk Kanotik, Arctic Kibrayok, Arctic Kiggiak, Arctic Tukta, Arctic Tender, Arctic Tender II and J. Mattson (Defendants)
Indexed as: Ferguson v. Arctic Transportation Ltd. (T.D.)
Trial Division, Hargrave P.—Vancouver, November 20 and December 7, 1995.
Practice — Parties — Joinder — Motion by defendant under R. 1716, opposed by plaintiff, to add Panama Canal Commission, already added as third party, as defendant in action in damages for physical injury suffered by plaintiff during transit of Canal — R. 1716 considered — Discretionary matter — Barring exceptional circumstances, defendants should not be forced upon plaintiff — On issue of whether entity ought to have been added as party, question resolved in terms of whether entity would lose any legal right — On issue of necessity to add as party to determine plaintiff’s case, convenience of defendant insufficient.
In February 1992, Captain Ferguson, a Panama Canal pilot, was struck by a steel wire rope during transit of the Canal by a barge under tow. The action was commenced in August 1993. Alleging that the Panama Canal Commission had the conduct and control of the tug and barge when the accident happened, the corporate defendant, in June 1995, obtained an order adding the Commission as a third party. The defendant herein sought to add the Commission as a defendant, pursuant to Rule 1716, so that the matter could be effectively determined and the direct liability of the Commission adjudicated upon.
Held, the motion should be dismissed.
It was well established that such an order was discretionary. The issue, on the plain wording of Rule 1716, was whether the Commission ought to have been joined as a party or the Commission’s presence was necessary to ensure that all matters in the action may be effectively and completely determined and adjudicated upon.
Prima facie, at common law, the plaintiff is entitled to choose the defendants against whom to proceed and to leave out any person or entity against whom he does not desire to proceed.
The case law was not conclusive as to whether the first branch of the test, whether an entity “ought to have been joined as a party” should be given a narrow or a broad interpretation. However, in International Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Potash Co. of America et al., the Supreme Court of Canada found that it was unnecessary to choose between the broader and the narrower view as to the scope of the Rule and decided the issue in terms of whether the party added as a defendant might otherwise lose a legal right to continue to carry on business. In the instant case, since the Commission would not lose any legal right, there was no reason to add the Commission as a defendant.
Nor was the Commission a necessary defendant, in that the absence of the Commission still left it open to ensure that all matters which the plaintiff has put in dispute may still be completely determined and adjudicated upon.
The plaintiff also raised an interesting point in submitting that while Rule 1716 dealt with the addition of a party, in the sense of a new party, in this case the Commission was already a third party.
Although adding the Commission as a defendant might be convenient for the corporate defendant, the Commission did not come within the ambit of Rule 1716 either as an entity that ought to be joined as a party, or as necessary to determine the issues in the plaintiff’s case. To make the third-party Commission a defendant would have required the plaintiff to amend its pleadings: that was for the plaintiff to consider, not the Court to order in this instance.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
Exchequer Court General Rules and Orders.
Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663, R. 1716(2).
Rules of Court, B.C. Reg. 310/76.
Rules of the Supreme Court, SI 1965/1776 (U.K.), O. 16, r. 11.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
International Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Potash Co. of America et al., [1965] S.C.R. 3; (1964), 47 D.L.R. (2d) 324; 43 C.P.R. 157; 28 Fox Pat. C. 190.
CONSIDERED:
Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Haynes, [1981] 2 F.C. 379 (1980), 117 D.L.R. (3d) 219; 80 CLLC 14,067 (T.D.); Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Eldorado Nuclear Ltd., [1981] 1 F.C. 289 (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 154; 36 N.R. 243 (C.A.); Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons, Ltd., [1956] 1 All E.R. 273 (Q.B.D.); Dix v. Great Western Railway Co. (1886), 55 L.J. Ch. 797; McCheane v. Gyles (No. 2), [1902] 1 Ch. 911; Boudreau v. Linsday (1962), 37 D.L.R. (2d) 175 (N.S.S.C.); Vandervell Trustees Ltd. v. White, [1971] A.C. 912 (H.L.); Pepsico, Inc. and Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1974), 14 C.P.R. (2d) 182 (F.C.T.D.); Chitty v. Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, [1978] 1 F.C. 830 (1977), 81 D.L.R. (3d) 136 (F.C.T.D.).
REFERRED TO:
Ferguson v. Arctic Transportation Ltd., [1995] 3 F.C. 656(T.D.); Martin v. Gay’s Taxi Ltd., [1953] 2 D.L.R. 774 (N.B.S.C.); Honeywell Inc. v. Litton Systems Canada Ltd. (1982), 67 C.P.R. (2d) 129 (F.C.T.D.); Algoma Central Railway v. Canada (1987), 10 F.T.R. 8 (F.C.T.D.); CIP Inc. v. Canada, [1988] F.C.J. No. 595 (T.D.) (QL); Enterprises Realty Ltd. v. Barnes Lake Cattle Co. Ltd. (1979), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 92; 13 B.C.L.R. 293; 10 C.P.C. 211 (C.A.).
MOTION by the corporate defendant, opposed by the plaintiff, to add the Panama Canal Commission, presently a third party, as a defendant pursuant to Rule 1716. Motion dismissed.
COUNSEL:
David F. McEwen for plaintiff.
H. Peter Swanson for defendants.
SOLICITORS:
McEwen, Schmitt & Co., Vancouver, for plaintiff.
Campney & Murphy, Vancouver, for defendants.
The following are the reasons for order rendered in English by
Hargrave P.: This motion, brought by the defendant Arctic Transportation Ltd., is to add the Panama Canal Commission (the Commission), presently a third party, as a defendant, as provided in subsection 1716(2) of the Federal Court Rules, [C.R.C., c. 663]. This addition of a defendant is vigorously opposed by the plaintiff.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of the February 1992 injury to Captain Ferguson, a Panama Canal pilot, who was struck by a steel wire rope during transit of the Canal by the barge AMT Transporter, the tow of the tug Arctic Nutsukpok. The action was commenced in August of 1993 and by the spring of 1995 the plaintiff and the defendant had completed examinations for discovery.
In June of 1995 the corporate defendant obtained an order adding the Commission as a third party. It appeared, among other things, that the Commission had the conduct and control of the tug and barge when the accident happened. That motion had been opposed by the plaintiff on the grounds of the delay that might result from adding a third party at a late date, given that the existing parties were ready to apply for a trial date. I felt it was equitable and in the interests of justice that the defendant obtain an extension of time within which to bring third-party proceedings against the Commission.
The Commission then challenged the third-party proceedings on the basis of sovereign immunity and disputed service of the third-party notice. Madam Justice Reed denied that argument in her reasons and order of September 6, [[1995] 3 F.C. 656(T.D.)] and went on to give instructions as to service, to be effected by September 15, 1995.
I understand service has been effected, however, the Commission has yet to take any further part in the proceedings.
MOTION TO ADD THE COMMISSION AS A DEFENDANT
The defendant now seeks to add the Commission as a defendant, pursuant to Rule 1716, the relevant portion of which reads:
Rule 1716. …
(2) At any stage of an action the Court may, on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application,
…
(b) order any person who ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the action may be effectively and completely determined and adjudicated upon, to be added as a party, ….
The basis for adding the Commission as a defendant is that the flotilla of tug and barge were under the direct control of the Commission’s pilots, riding crew and shore personnel, and that it was through the neglect of the Commission that the wire rope, one end of which was made fast to the barge, hung-up on some portion of the Canal structure, suddenly came up tight and lifted off the deck, injuring Captain Ferguson.
By way of better explanation, the barge was equipped with two steel wire rope emergency pick-up lines, each made fast to the bow of the barge and running towards the stern, one along each side of the barge deck. When under tow a rope and buoy, made fast to the free end of each pick-up line, is streamed astern of the barge so that should the main towing gear fail and the barge break free from the tug, the tug might then more easily take the barge in tow again by picking up one of the trailing lines. As is standard practice for transit of the Panama Canal, each of the wire pick-up lines was secured inboard at the side of the barge, just inside the deck edge, by welded steel clips, in such a way that bights of the line ought not to hang overboard and become fouled on the walls of the locks during transit through the Canal, but yet be lightly enough secured, along the deck edge, to allow the pick-up line to be pulled free of the side of the barge should the tug take the barge under tow by means of one of the two emergency pick-up lines.
CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT’S POSITION
In the present instance, the defendant presents a reasonably arguable case that the barge was in fact under the control of the Commission, through its procedure and by its employees, and while under the control of the Commission the barge may have struck a lock wall harder than intended, shaking the starboard pick-up line loose and allowing it to drop over the side of the barge, to then hang up on some portion of the lock wall. As the barge moved ahead the wire rope pick-up line came under tension. From the report of the proceedings of the Board of local inspectors of the Commission it would seem that the lead of the line from the raised fo’c’s’le of the barge caused the line to lift clear of the lower main deck level, catching Captain Ferguson.
The defendant says that the Commission ought to be joined as an important and necessary party so that the matter can be effectively determined and the direct liability of the Commission adjudicated upon. In the alternative, the defendant says that dealing with all of the evidence and determining how the accident happened will be difficult without the presence of the Commission as a defendant. In the end result the defendant wishes to be able to urge at trial the direct liability of the Commission.
Counsel for the defendant points out that there are alternate tests by which a defendant might be added under paragraph 1716(2)(b) of the Rules to ensure that all matters in dispute may be effectively and completely determined and adjudicated upon. The first test is that the proposed person or entity ought to have been joined and the second is that of necessary presence. The defendant submits that the Commission meets the requirements of either test.
The defendant’s counsel referred to Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Haynes, [1981] 2 F.C. 379(T.D.), in which Mr. Justice Cattanach pointed out that at common law and in chancery matters a plaintiff could not be compelled to proceed against persons whom he has no desire to sue (at page 385), but that was changed by paragraph 1716(2)(b): “Under Rule 1716 a person who is not a party may be added as a defendant against the wishes of the plaintiff either on the application of the defendant or on the person’s own intervention or in extremely rare cases by the Court of its own motion.” (Ibid.)
The Haynes case was an appeal from the finding of a tribunal dealing with a discriminatory labour practice allegation. However, unlike the proceedings before the tribunal, in which the complainants appeared as parties, the complainants were omitted from the Federal Court appeal proceedings, an application for mandamus. Mr. Justice Cattanach pointed out that no disposition of the application for mandamus might be made without the complainants being a party to the Federal Court action. In reaching that conclusion, Mr. Justice Cattanach looked at the test applied by the Court of Appeal in Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Eldorado Nuclear Ltd., [1981] 1 F.C. 289 at pages 291-292:
In our view the complainant is an essential party to these proceedings and ought to have been joined as such, served with the originating notice and, thus, have been given the right to appear, if she wished, to file her own affidavit material, to cross examine on the affidavits filed by the other parties, and to have been heard. That she is an essential party is demonstrated by the fact that she, as the complainant, is deprived at the moment, if the Trial Division’s order stands, of any possibility of having her claim adjudicated favourably to her. She is the only person who has a personal and vital interest in the outcome of the claim. [Emphasis added.]
Mr. Justice Cattanach emphasized what he conceived to be the true ratio decidendi of the Eldorado Nuclear case, that the intended party was the only person who had a personal and vital interest in the outcome, expressing it neatly in a colloquial way by saying that it was the intended party’s ox that might be gored. Indeed, in the Haynes case the Judge pointed out that the intended parties “must be added as parties and given the opportunity to participate even if they do not choose to do so and this is the condition precedent to a valid order being given” (at page 392).
In the present instance the Commission may be interested, but it is neither the only entity interested nor an entity without whose presence the action may not be effectively and completely determined and adjudicated upon. Given the assertions by counsel for the plaintiff that the negligence leading to the accident was that of the defendant Arctic Transportation Ltd., in failing to properly secure the steel wire pick-up line to the barge deck in the first place, I have some difficulty with this argument. However, adding of a party under Rule 1716 is not something to be measured by hard and fast rules but rather, as the Court of Appeal pointed out in the Eldorado Nuclear case, supra, at page 291, such an order is discretionary. In the present instance, if the Commission, through being responsible for its employees, is solely at fault, that is a problem the plaintiff brings on himself. It ought not to be for another party or for the Court to force the plaintiff into suing an additional defendant unless there is a very strong reason to do so.
Turning to the second test under paragraph 1716(2)(b), the defendant says that the presence of the Commission before the Court, as a defendant, is necessary to properly deal with all the evidence and that this would be difficult without the presence of the Commission. Indeed, counsel submits that the defendant needs the presence of the Commission to explain their operation, the inspection by the Commission’s employees of the barge, their control over the tug and barge flotilla, the operation of the Canal and how the accident happened. To my mind, the Commission may be a necessary witness, but that does not make the Commission a necessary defendant and this is a point to which I will return.
The defendant urges that the Commission be made a defendant to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings. The defendant submits that if the Commission is not made a defendant in the present proceedings, the result might be that the plaintiff may then sue the Commission, in a new proceeding, with the present defendant, Arctic Transportation, being brought back into new proceedings. On this point, I prefer the view of Mr. Justice Devlin, as he then was, in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons, Ltd., [1956] 1 All E.R. 273 (Q.B.D.), at page 285, who gave a narrower construction to the equivalent English Rule:
I do not, with deference to those who have thought otherwise, agree that the main object of the rule is to prevent multiplicity of actions, though it may incidentally have that effect. The court has other ways of doing that which are amply sufficient for the purpose—by ordering consolidation, or the bringing of actions on together, or third-party proceedings, and so on. The primary object of the rule I believe to be to replace the plea in abatement. The object of that plea was to “abate” an action in which all the proper parties were not before the court. The rule is more flexible than the plea, but its object is fundamentally the same. It is not to marry a future action to an existing one, but to ensure that all the necessary parties to the existing one (using “necessary” in the broad sense of being necessary to effectual and complete adjudication in the existing action) are before the court.
It may be an incidental effect of paragraph 1716(2)(b), that it avoids a multiplicity of actions, which is a benefit of the Rule. However, that is not the prime reason for the Rule. Thus, my consideration of the motion, to which I now turn, is on the plain wording of the Rule, whether the Commission ought to have been joined as a party or the Commission’s presence is necessary to ensure that all matters in the action may be effectively and completely determined and adjudicated upon.
ANALYSIS
There are a number of peripheral factors, urged by both counsel, which seem to me to balance off. For example, on the one hand, the defendant says that adding the Commission as a defendant may prevent a subsequent action, but on the other hand, the plaintiff says that to add a defendant at this date, would only add further delay to the delay that has already been in fact experienced by reason of adding the Commission as a third party. Thus, as I say, the real issue revolves around the interpretation of Rule 1716.
Prima facie, at common law, the plaintiff is entitled to choose the defendants against whom to proceed and to leave out any person or entity against whom he does not desire to proceed: see for example Martin v. Gay’s Taxi Ltd., [1953] 2 D.L.R. 774 (N.B.S.C.), at page 775; Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Haynes, supra, at page 385; Honeywell Inc. v. Litton Systems Canada Ltd. (1982), 67 C.P.R. (2d) 129 (F.C.T.D.), at page 134; Algoma Central Railway v. Canada (1987), 10 F.T.R. 8 (F.C.T.D.), at page 9, and CIP Inc. v. Canada, [1988] F.C.J. No. 595 (T.D.) (QL).
Paragraph 1716(2)(b) may be used to require the addition of a party, in special circumstances. Counsel for the plaintiff submits that he has been unable to find any case remotely similar to the present in which an order has been made compelling a plaintiff to sue a party whom he or she does not wish to sue. That may be a fair statement for in instances in which a plaintiff has opposed the addition of a particular defendant, that opposition seems generally to have been effective unless, in the words of Mr. Justice Kay in Dix v. Great Western Railway Co. (1886), 55 L.J. Ch. 797, at page 798, it would be impossible “for the Court `effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause’ without the presence of certain co-covenantees as defendants”: see also the discussion of this in McCheane v. Gyles (No. 2), [1902] 1 Ch. 911, at page 915 et seq. In any event, the test, where a plaintiff opposes the addition of a defendant, is a stringent one requiring special or exceptional circumstances to allow a departure from the general rule that it is for the plaintiff to choose the defendants, not to have defendants forced upon him or her: see for example Boudreau v. Linsday (1962), 37 D.L.R. (2d) 175 (N.S.S.C.), at page 176.
Our paragraph 1716(2)(b) is derived from Order 16, rule 11 (now Order 15, rule 6) of the English Rules of the Supreme Court [SI 1965/1776 (U.K.)]. It is also similar to British Columbia Rule 15(5)(a)(ii) [Rules of Court, B.C. Reg. 310/76] and the corresponding rule in a number of other provinces. Thus, the English and British Columbia cases are of assistance in considering the two separate tests which apply to the addition of a defendant.
In considering the first test, that the Commission is an entity who “ought to have been joined as a party”, Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons, Ltd., supra, is of assistance. Mr. Justice Devlin takes a narrow approach and points out that this provision applies to parties who ought to have been joined, in the strict legal sense, for example joint contractors or the co-covenantees of the Dix case, supra.
The Amon case was touched upon by Viscount Dilhorne, in his reasons in Vandervell Trustees Ltd. v. White, [1971] A.C. 912 (H.L.), who accepted Mr. Justice Devlin’s view in the Amon case and pointed out that the plain language of the rule did not provide for the addition of a party whenever it was merely just or convenient to do so, but rather only if the person ought to have been joined as a party (at pages 935-936). For a further analysis of and the adoption of the narrow interpretation of the first branch of a similar rule, that is whether a party ought to have been joined, see Enterprises Realty Ltd. v. Barnes Lake Cattle Co. Ltd. (1979), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 92, at page 96 et seq. in which the B.C. Court of Appeal draws on a substantial line of cases supporting the narrow interpretation of the B.C. Rule, which is similar to our Rule and concludes that a party may be added as a necessary party only if the question at issue cannot be adjudicated unless the new party is added.
In the present instance, while it might be convenient to have the Commission joined as a party, that does not make them a party who ought to be joined in the strict legal sense.
Turning now to the defendant’s submission on the second branch of the test, that the Commission is a party “necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute may be effectively and completely determined and adjudicated upon,” the Amon case, supra, is a good starting point. Mr. Justice Devlin asked the rhetorical question “What makes a person a necessary party?” and then went on to answer (at pages 286-287):
What makes a person a necessary party? It is not, of course, merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance and is afraid that the existing parties may not advance them adequately. That would mean that on the construction of a clause in a common form contract many parties would claim to be heard, and, if there were power to admit any, there is no principle of discretion by which some could be admitted and others refused. The court might often think it convenient or desirable that some of such persons should be heard so that the court could be sure that it had found the complete answer, but no one would suggest that it is necessary to hear them for that purpose. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action, and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. [Emphasis added.]
Mr. Justice Devlin then considered the question of where the line should be drawn in the sense of a commercial interest in a case, on the one hand, and a legal interest on the other hand, for only the latter would suffice to make an interested party necessary. He pointed out that “A person is legally interested in the answer only if he can say that it may lead to a result that will affect him legally—that is by curtailing his legal rights” (at page 287). He concluded by determining the test to be (at page 290):
May the order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect the intervenor in the enjoyment of his legal rights?
Mr. Justice Devlin conceded that one defendant seeking to join another as defendant does not necessarily have to show that the proposed defendant will be directly affected by an order in the action as it is constituted, but rather may be able to succeed by showing that he cannot set up a desired defence without the new defendant. In short, the test that is appropriate to determine the necessity of a party may vary according to the circumstances (at page 290).
Bringing this test home to Canada, it has been applied both by our Court and by the Supreme Court of Canada. In International Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Potash Co. of America et al., [1965] S.C.R. 3, Mr. Justice Cartwright considered the Amon case and noted that there were two views as to the scope of what was then the English Order 16, rule 11 and which applied by virtue of the Canadian Exchequer Court Rules. One view was that the Rule gave a wide power to join any party who had a claim relating to the subject matter of the action and the other, a narrower approach, hemmed in by limitations, was reflected in part by the test “May the order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect the intervenor in the exercise of his legal rights?” (At page 10.) However, he went on to find it unnecessary to choose between the broader and the narrower view as to the scope of the Rule.
In Pepsico, Inc. and Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1974), 14 C.P.R. (2d) 182 (F.C.T.D.), Mr. Justice Urie, of the Federal Court, applied the test from Amon. He contrasted its use by the Supreme Court of Canada in the International Minerals case, supra, where the party seeking to intervenor would have lost a right to use a process, which it had been using for years, if it were not joined, and situation in Pepsico in which there were no substantive rights that might be lost and therefore, in his view, no legal rights of the party to be joined would be directly affected.
In Chitty v. Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, [1978] 1 F.C. 830(T.D.), Mr. Justice Dubé dealt with an application by parties that they become defendants. The existing defendant did not object. The plaintiffs objected primarily because it would result in undue delay. Again, the Court considered which approach, from Amon, ought to be adopted, either the narrower view, hedged about with limitations, or the broader view, but came to no conclusion. Perhaps that determination is not necessary in that after opting for a narrow test in Amon, Mr. Justice Devlin then admitted that the test was somewhat flexible and might vary according to the circumstances (at page 290).
In the International Minerals case, supra, the Supreme Court did not, as I say, have to choose between a narrower and a broader enunciation of the Rule for adding parties, but rather pointed out that the party added as a defendant might otherwise lose a legal right to continue to carry on business. In the present instance the Commission would not lose any legal right, although it could suffer some commercial setback by way of a claim by the present defendant for indemnity. Thus on this test, there is no reason to add the Commission as a defendant.
Nor is the Commission a necessary defendant, in the sense that the absence of the Commission still leaves it open to ensure that all matters which the plaintiff has put in dispute in this action may still be completely determined and adjudicated upon. It may be that the Commission is a necessary witness but, as Mr. Justice Devlin pointed out at page 286 of Amon, supra, a necessary party is not merely someone who has relevant evidence to give on some of the issues.
Counsel for the plaintiff also raises an interesting point in submitting that Rule 1716 deals with the addition of a party, in the sense of a new party, but in this case the Commission is already a third party. Counsel submits that a defendant ought not to be able to control the way in which a plaintiff’s case is structured and advanced by forcing the plaintiff to join a third party as a defendant. However, already having concluded that the Commission ought not to be added as a party defendant, against the wishes of the plaintiff, I do not have to consider whether Rule 1716 allows the addition of a party, as a defendant, when that entity is already a third party.
CONCLUSION
To add the Panama Canal Commission, as a defendant, against the opposition of the plaintiff, may well be convenient for the defendant, Arctic Transportation Ltd., however the Commission does not come within the ambit of Rule 1716 either as an entity that ought to be joined as a party, or as necessary to determine the issues in the plaintiff’s case.
In many instances, where similar applications have been made, the answer given by the Court is that the intended defendant ought rather to be added as a third party. That has already been done in this instance. To go further might, as I say, be a convenience to the defendant, either to have the Commission there, in the role of a witness to give evidence or possibly, if the plaintiff’s analysis of the case is wrong, to make the Commission primarily liable. However, to make the third-party Commission a defendant would also require the plaintiff to amend its pleadings: that is for the plaintiff to consider, not the Court to order in this instance.
The motion is dismissed. I thank counsel for a thorough and interesting presentation.