T-1385-76 
In re Supinder Singh Manhas and in re Immigra
tion Act 
Trial Division, Smith D.J.—Edmonton, May 19 
and July 9, 1976. 
Immigration—Prohibition and certiorari—Petitioner enter
ing as non-immigrant and marrying citizen—Granted Minis
terial Permit pending wife's attaining age of 18, when she 
could sponsor him—Wife applying to sponsor him, then 
obtaining divorce, and withdrawing sponsorship—Petitioner 
consulting immigration officer—Officer making section 22 
report without advising petitioner of results of investigation— 
Petitioner directed to report for hearing—Objecting that Spe
cial Inquiry Officer lacked jurisdiction to hold it—Immigra-
tion Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-2, ss. 7(3), 8(9), 22, 23, and 
Regulations, s. 31(1)(a). 
Petitioner, who entered Canada as a non-immigrant, married 
a 17 year old Canadian, and was granted a Ministerial Permit 
permitting him to remain in Canada pending his wife's attain
ing the age of 18, at which time she could sponsor him for 
admission. The wife applied to sponsor petitioner but subse
quently obtained a divorce and then withdrew the application. 
His permit expiring, petitioner consulted an immigration officer 
who made a section 22 report, although the results of his 
investigation were not made known to petitioner. Petitioner was 
then directed to report for a hearing; he did so, but objected 
that the Special Inquiry Officer lacked jurisdiction. He then 
applied for prohibition against further proceeding with the 
hearing, and certiorari to quash the report. 
Held, the application is dismissed. When a Ministerial 
Permit has expired, the holder ceases to have any legal right to 
remain in Canada. He ceases to be a non-immigrant or to be in 
the particular class in which he was admitted as a non-immi
grant, and thus comes within the provisions of section 7(3) of 
the Act, requiring him, if he remains in Canada, to report to 
the nearest immigration officer for examination forthwith, and 
deeming him to be a person seeking admission. While the 
officer may be subject to criticism, if, as alleged, he made a 
section 22 report without advising petitioner of the results of his 
investigation, such failure does not deprive him of jurisdiction 
to make the report. Nor was the order to report for a hearing 
outside the jurisdiction of the officer concerned. Section 23(2) 
provides that where a Special Inquiry Officer receives a section 
22 report concerning a person (with certain exceptions) he shall 
admit him, or let him come into Canada, or cause him to be 
detained for an immediate inquiry. The Special Inquiry Officer 
thus is statutorily empowered to order an inquiry, and section 
23(2) applies to petitioner (who came from India). This is not a 
proper case for prohibition or certiorari, and petitioner will not 
be prejudiced if the hearing proceeds. 
APPLICATION. 
COUNSEL: 
J. A. Sutherland for petitioner. 
R. N. Dunne for respondents. 
SOLICITORS: 
J. A. Sutherland, Calgary, for petitioner. 
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for 
respondents. 
The following are the reasons for judgment 
rendered in English by 
SMITH D.J.: This is an Application on behalf of 
the petitioner for a writ of prohibition directed to 
C. J. Williams, Special Inquiry Officer, of the 
Canada Immigration Centre, of the City of Cal-
gary, in the Province of Alberta, prohibiting the 
said C. J. Williams, Special Inquiry Officer, from 
proceeding further with an immigration inquiry 
before the said C. J. Williams sitting at the 
Canada Immigration Centre, Calgary, Alberta, 
and for a further order of this Honourable Court, 
directed to the said C. J. Williams, Special Inquiry 
Officer, of the Canada Immigration Centre, Cal-
gary, Alberta to show cause why a writ of certio-
rari should not issue to remove into this Honour
able Court, and to quash a report made under 
section 22 of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 
I-2 and amendments thereto made by D. R. 
Schow, an Immigration Officer of the Canada 
Immigration Centre, Calgary, Alberta, dated 
March 26th, 1976, directed to the said C. J. 
Williams, Special Inquiry Officer, and for a fur
ther writ of certiorari to quash the said report 
under section 22 of the Immigration Act as herein-
before described made by the said Immigration 
Officer, D. R. Schow, of the Canada Immigration 
Centre, Calgary, Alberta on March 26th, 1976. 
The notice of motion sets out thirteen specific 
grounds for the application of which the following 
summary contains those that appear to be the most 
important. 
The petitioner is a sponsored dependant within 
the meaning of the Immigration Regulations, 
being sponsored by his wife, Jasveer Kaur Victoria 
Manhas (Parhar) a resident Canadian citizen, for 
admission to Canada for permanent residence. 
As such he is exempt from the provisions of 
section 28(1) and (2) of the Regulations. 
The petitioner is the holder of an expired Minis
terial Permit and therefore, pursuant to section 
8(4) of the Immigration Act, neither the Immigra
tion Officer (Schow) nor the Special Inquiry Offi
cer (Williams) has jurisdiction to rule on the 
question whether the petitioner has the right or is 
entitled to remain in Canada. Under said section 
8(4) only the Minister of Manpower and Immigra
tion, or if authorized by the Minister, the Deputy 
Minister or the Director of the Immigration 
Branch of the Department, has jurisdiction to 
make a deportation order respecting a person 
whose permit has been cancelled or has expired. 
The petitioner is a person entitled to admission 
to Canada. He is not a person subject to be 
reported under section 22 of the Immigration Act 
and the Immigration Officer had no legal jurisdic
tion to make the report which he made under that 
section on March 26th, 1976. 
The Special Inquiry Officer lacked any legal or 
any jurisdiction to convene or hold a special immi
gration inquiry under the Immigration Act, 
respecting the petitioner. 
The facts, as contained in the petitioner's affida
vit and not denied by the respondents, may be 
stated as follows: 
The petitioner entered Canada on a valid non-
immigrant visa on August 12th, 1974. On Decem-
ber 8th, 1974, at Nanaimo in British Columbia, he 
married Jasveer Kaur Victoria Parhar, who was 
born at Duncan in British Columbia and at the 
date of the marriage was seventeen years old. 
Pending his wife attaining the age of eighteen 
years, at which age she would be eligible to spon
sor him for admission to Canada for permanent 
residence, the petitioner was granted a Ministerial 
Permit to remain in Canada, under section 8 of the 
Immigration Act, on December 24th, 1974, which 
permit was extended on July 25th, 1975. This 
permit had expired (paragraph D of the petition
er's affidavit). The date of expiry was not stated to 
the Court, but was probably prior to February 3rd, 
1976. 
After attaining the age of eighteen years, the 
petitioner's wife applied, pursuant to section 
31(1)(a) of the Immigration Regulations to spon
sor him as a sponsored dependant for landed immi
grant status. There is no evidence before the Court 
of any final disposition of her application. 
The petitioner's affidavit, dated April 9th, 1976, 
stated that his wife was expecting a child that 
month. 
Unhappy differences having arisen between the 
petitioner and his wife, she had taken divorce 
proceedings against him. Prior to the date of the 
affidavit she had obtained a Decree Nisi of 
divorce, but the petitioner had retained a solicitor 
in Vancouver to appeal the Decree Nisi, as he was 
seeking reconciliation with his wife. 
On February 3rd, 1976, the petitioner, in the 
presence of his solicitor, John A. Sutherland, con
sulted an Immigration Officer, D. R. Schow, at 
the City of Calgary, in Alberta, and was advised 
by him that he would seek further information 
from Ottawa on the petitioner's status and would 
advise prior to any action being taken. 
On March 29th, 1976, the said D. R. Schow 
made a report under section 22 of the Immigration 
Act and Regulations, respecting the petitioner, 
without advising the petitioner or his solicitor of 
the results of his investigation. 
By letter bearing the same date, March 29th, 
1976, but not received until April 7th, 1976, C. J. 
Williams, a Special Inquiry Officer at the Canada 
Immigration Centre in Calgary, directed the peti
tioner to report for an immigration hearing at the 
said Immigration Centre on April 8th, 1976. The 
petitioner attended as directed and objected to the 
hearing on the ground that the Special Inquiry 
Officer had no jurisdiction to hold the inquiry. 
This application was launched the next day. 
One further fact needs to be stated. At a date 
prior to these proceedings, the petitioner's wife 
wrote to the Department of Manpower and Immi
gration withdrawing her sponsorship of the peti
tioner for admission to Canada. 
The first question to be considered is whether 
the petitioner is a sponsored dependant for admis- 
sion to Canada for permanent residence. The evi
dence before the Court indicates only that the 
petitioner's wife applied to sponsor him. No dispo
sition of her application is disclosed. If it had been 
dealt with favourably it is most unlikely that Mr. 
Schow, after stating on February 3rd, 1976, that 
he would seek further information from Ottawa on 
the petitioner's status, would, on March 29th, 
1976, make a report concerning him pursuant to 
section 22 of the Immigration Act and Regula
tions. My opinion that no favourable decision was 
ever made concerning sponsorship by the petition
er's wife is strengthened by the evidence about 
divorce proceedings. Counsel for the petitioner 
submitted, without advancing reasons for his opin
ion, that the petitioner's wife could not withdraw 
her sponsorship. It is not necessary to examine the 
validity of this submission, since in any event the 
facts that she had begun divorce proceedings 
against the petitioner and had obtained a Decree 
Nisi in those proceedings would bear heavily 
against a favourable decision. The true situation 
cannot be ascertained with certainty on the evi
dence tendered on this motion, but would be ascer
tainable at an inquiry before a Special Inquiry 
Officer. 
I am unable to agree with counsel's submission 
that as the petitioner is the holder of an expired 
Ministerial Permit to be in Canada only the Minis
ter (or the Deputy Minister or Director if author
ized by the Minister) has the power to make a 
deportation order against him. Section 8 of the 
Immigration Act sets out the powers of the Minis
ter to issue a permit (for a specified period not 
exceeding twelve months) to extend or cancel it, 
and on its cancellation to make a deportation order 
respecting the person concerned. Each of these 
powers may be exercised by the Minister without 
invoking formal procedures by way of a report by 
an immigration officer and an inquiry by a Special 
Inquiry Officer. On the other hand these powers 
given to the Minister do not preclude such formal 
procedures where the circumstances warrant them. 
Counsel for the Crown stated that in practice these 
formal procedures are always followed, because 
their rules provide assurance that the case for the 
person desiring to enter or remain in Canada will 
be fairly and fully presented. 
When a Ministerial Permit to be in Canada has 
expired the holder ceases to have any legal right to 
remain in Canada. He ceases to be a non-immi
grant or to be in the particular class in which he 
was admitted as a non-immigrant. He thus comes 
within the provisions of section 7(3) of the Immi
gration Act, which require him, if he remains in 
Canada to, "forthwith report such facts to the 
nearest immigration officer and present himself 
for examination at such place and time as he may 
be directed", and which provide further that he 
shall, for the purposes of the examination and all 
other purposes under the Act, be deemed to be a 
person seeking admission to Canada. 
On February 3rd, 1976, after his Ministerial 
Permit had expired, the petitioner's affidavit dis
closes that he went to see D. R. Schow, an Immi
gration Officer, in Calgary. He obviously was 
concerned about his status in Canada, because his 
affidavit states that Mr. Schow advised him that 
he would seek further information on his status 
from Ottawa, and advise prior to any action being 
taken. 
If the petitioner's affidavit is correct in stating 
that Mr. Schow made a report under section 22, 
concerning the petitioner, without having advised 
the petitioner or his solicitor of the result of his 
investigation, he may be subject to criticism on 
that score, but such failure to advise does not 
mean that he was deprived of jurisdiction to report 
under section 22. 
After considering the facts, in so far as they 
have been disclosed on this motion, and reviewing 
the relevant provisions of the Immigration Act and 
considering a number of cases cited to me by both 
counsel, I find no reason for holding that the 
Immigration Officer, D. R. Schow acted outside 
the scope of his jurisdiction. 
With respect to the action of the Special Inquiry 
Officer, C. J. Williams, in ordering the petitioner 
to report for an immigration hearing in Calgary, I 
find that he also was acting within the scope of his 
jurisdiction. Section 23(2) of the Immigration Act 
provides that where a Special Inquiry Officer 
receives a report under section 22 concerning a 
person (other than one who seeks to come to 
Canada from the United States or St. Pierre and 
Miquelon) he shall admit him or let him come into 
Canada or may cause such person to be detained 
for an immediate inquiry under the Act. The 
Special Inquiry Officer thus has statutory author
ity to order an inquiry. Subsection (2) of section 
23 applies to the petitioner, who came to Canada 
from India. 
This is not a proper case for an order of prohibi
tion and certiorari. In my view the inquiry before a 
Special Inquiry Officer should proceed. The peti
tioner will not be prejudiced, as all the facts 
relevant to his desire to be admitted to Canada for 
permanent residence will be before the Special 
Inquiry Officer. 
The application is dismissed. 
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