A-20-77
Clara Lilia Reategui Ruiz (Applicant)
v.
Minister of Manpower and Immigration
(Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Urie J., MacKay and Kerr
D.JJ.—Toronto, March 15, 1977.
Judicial review — Immigration — Application to set aside
deportation order — Allegation of bias against Special Inqui
ry Officer — Whether Officer deprived himself of jurisdiction
by inquiring as to steps taken by applicant outside inquiry —
Whether Officer erred in refusing to adjourn inquiry pending
hearing by `officer-in-charge" — Federal Court Act, R.S.C.
1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28.
APPLICATION for judicial review.
COUNSEL:
C. Hoppe for applicant.
H. Erlichman for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Duggan, Hoppe, Niman & Stott, Toronto, for
applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment of
the Court delivered orally in English by
URIE J.: This section 28 application is brought
to review and set aside the deportation order made
on January 7, 1977 by Special Inquiry Officer
Michael D. Prue, against the applicant.
At the opening of the application, counsel for
the applicant sought to vary the contents of the
case by adding thereto the joint affidavit of the
applicant and her husband, Ronald Fox. The pur
pose in seeking to file the affidavit was, as we
understand it, to show that there was bias on the
part of the Special Inquiry Officer in the conduct
of the inquiry. For that limited purpose, it will be
admitted. We have carefully read both the affida
vit (which we may say is seriously deficient in
showing the context in which the alleged remarks
of the Special Inquiry Officer indicating his bias
were made) as well as the lengthy transcript of the
proceedings, and fail to find in either any ground
for the allegation of bias and on that ground the
applicant has failed.
The only other ground upon which the applicant
relied was that the Special Inquiry Officer lost his
jurisdiction by reason of the fact that he made
inquiries of his superiors in rank to ascertain the
steps that had been taken outside the special inqui
ry by the applicant's then fiancé and counsel to
secure a permit for the applicant's admission to
Canada. Having ascertained that information, it
was alleged that this formed the basis of his deci
sion to refuse to adjourn the inquiry for the hold
ing of a so-called "officer-in-charge" hearing to
determine whether the applicant, on compassion
ate grounds should be granted permission to
remain in Canada. In so doing, it was submitted
that he deprived himself of jurisdiction.
The Special Inquiry Officer stated repeatedly
and vehemently that the information he obtained
did not affect his determination as to whether or
not the adjournment requested should be granted
and that he had sound reasons for not acceding to
the request. We are of the opinion that he had the
right to make the inquiries which he made con
cerning the activities of the applicant and her
advisers, outside the inquiry, to obtain her admis
sion to Canada. Moreover, we are of the opinion
that he made no error in the exercise of his
discretion to refuse an adjournment of the inquiry
for a hearing by the "officer-in-charge" which
hearing, so far as we are aware, is one made
outside the Immigration Act and Regulations. We
are unable to see, therefore, how he can be said to
have lost his jurisdiction to conclude the inquiry.
The section 28 application will, therefore, be
dismissed.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.