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A-247-78
In re Public Service Staff Relations Board deci sion dated May 3, 1978 (File 166-2-3077)
Court of Appeal, Jackett C.J., Heald and Ryan JJ.—Ottawa, November 28 and 30, 1978.
Judicial review — Public Service — Court of Appeal, on section 28 application, referred matter back to Adjudicator for further consideration and for a decision on basis of certain directions — Adjudicator deciding to withdraw from case — Application to set aside Adjudicator's decision to withdraw — Public Service Staff Relations Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-35, ss. 90, 91, 92 — Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28.
After the Court of Appeal gave judgment pursuant to section 28 of the Federal Court Act that a decision of a member of the Public Service Staff Relations Board acting as Adjudicator be set aside and referred back for further hearing and consider ation, and for a decision on the basis of certain directions, the Adjudicator rendered a "decision" expressing his decision to withdraw from the case and his reasons for doing so. This section 28 application is to set aside that "decision".
Held, the application is dismissed. Mr. O'Shea's decision of May 3, 1978 is not a "decision" within section 28 of the Federal Court Act. It does not purport to decide anything that may be decided by a board member acting as an adjudicator and he does not, thereby, as an adjudicator, "refuse to exercise" any jurisdiction vested in adjudicators by the Public Service Staff Relations Act. All that decision does is indicate Mr. O'Shea's personal decision not to act as "adjudicator" in the particular case, making it clear that, in his view, "some other adjudicator should make the necessary determination in this matter".
APPLICATION for judicial review. COUNSEL:
Maurice W. Wright, Q.C. for Sant P. Singh. Walter Nisbet, Q.C. and Michael A. Kelen for Deputy Attorney General of Canada. No one appearing for Public Service Staff Relations Board.
SOLICITORS:
Soloway, Wright, Houston, Greenberg, O'Grady & Morin, Ottawa, for Sant P. Singh.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for Deputy Attorney General of Canada.
J. D. McCormick, Public Service Staff Rela tions Board, Ottawa, for Public Service Staff Relations Board.
The following are the reasons for judgment delivered orally in English by
JACKETT C.J.: This is a section 28 application to set aside a "decision" of a member of the Public Service Staff Relations Board acting as an adjudicator.
The events leading up to the application may be summarized as follows:
(a) On February 2, 1977, the applicant present ed a grievance, under section 90(1) of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-35,' that the appropriate collective agreement had "not been applied properly with respect to" his pay;
(b) By the collective agreement in question, an employee in the position to which the applicant had been appointed on January 1, 1970 was entitled to be paid in accordance with a certain scale of rates but, by virtue of a part of the agreement hereinafter referred to as "note 5", an increase from the fifth rate in the scale to the sixth rate required a "recommendation of a departmental ... committee and the approval of the deputy head", and, by virtue of "note 6", there was a requirement that a "departmental ... committee ... review the performance" of
' Subsection (1) of section 90 reads as follows:
90. (1) Where any employee feels himself to be aggrieved
(a) by the interpretation or application in respect of him of
(i) a provision of a statute, or of a regulation, by-law, direction or other instrument made or issued by the employer, dealing with terms and conditions of employ ment, or
(ii) a provision of a collective agreement or an arbitral award; or
(b) as a result of any occurrence or matter affecting his terms and conditions of employment, other than a provi sion described in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii),
in respect of which no administrative procedure for redress is provided in or under an Act of Parliament, he is entitled, subject to subsection (2), to present the grievance at each of the levels, up to and including the final level, in the grievance process provided for by this Act.
such an employee within 2 years from the date of appointment to the relevant scale of rates and it was further required that, if his rates were not then increased, his performance be further reviewed each year until his pay was increased "in accordance with Note(s) ... (5)";
(c) In May, 1977, that grievance not having been dealt with to his satisfaction, it was referred to adjudication under section 91(1) z of the Act;
(d) On August 8, 1977, J. D. O'Shea, Q.C., a Board Member and Adjudicator, rendered a "decision" in which he expressed the view that he had jurisdiction under section 91(1) (b) by reason of certain facts that he found "could properly be characterized as disciplinary action" as a result of which the applicant "sustained a financial penalty" and made an "award" direct ing the Deputy Head "to approve the placement of the grievor's salary above the barrier effective as of January 1, 1975, in accordance with the recommendation of the first Assessment Com mittee";
(e) On January 7, 1978, this Court gave judg ment, under section 28 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, setting that decision aside and referring the matter back for further hearing and consideration and for a decision on the basis
(a) that note 6 in the Appendix to the relevant collective agreement has never been complied with in respect to the respondent,
(b) that the Adjudicator cannot carry out the functions of the Committee or deputy head referred to in note 5 in the said Appendix, and
(c) that the Adjudicator should decide what relief the respondent is entitled to, after hearing such evidence, if any, as the parties submit with regard thereto.
(f) On May 3, 1978, Mr. O'Shea rendered a "decision" by which he expressed his decision to
2 Subsection (1) of section 91 reads:
91. (1) Where an employee has presented a grievance up to and including the final level in the grievance process with respect to
(a) the interpretation or application in respect of him of a provision of a collective agreement or an arbitral award, or
(b) disciplinary action resulting in discharge, suspension or a financial penalty,
and his grievance has not been dealt wish to his satisfaction, he may refer the grievance to adjudication.
"withdraw from this case" and his reasons therefor.
This section 28 application is to set aside Mr. O'Shea's "decision" of May 3, 1978.
In my view, Mr. O'Shea's decision of May 3, 1978 is not a "decision" within section 28 of the Federal Court Act. It does not purport to decide anything that may be decided by a board member acting as an adjudicator and he does not, thereby, as an adjudicator, "refuse to exercise" any juris diction vested in adjudicators by the Public Ser vice Staff Relations Act. All that the "decision" does is indicate Mr. O'Shea's personal decision not to act as "adjudicator" in the particular case, making it clear that, in his view, "some other adjudicator should make the necessary determina tion in this matter". I am, therefore, of opinion that the section 28 application should be dismissed.
In reaching this conclusion, I should say that I am in agreement with the view, apparently held by Mr. O'Shea, that the reference back under section 52(d) of the Federal Court Act, by this Court's judgment of January 17, 1978 (Attorney General v. Sant P. Singh) may be acted upon by any member of the Board "assigned" to act as adjudicator in the matter under section 92 of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, as amended by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 67, s. 24. 3 It is to be hoped that, upon reconsideration, Mr. O'Shea will change his decision not to do so. I have no doubt that he is in a much better position to complete the case than any other member of the Board could be.
Before leaving the matter, in view of the obscurity that Mr. O'Shea has found in this Court's decision of January 17, 1978, I should make some comment thereon.
In the first place, I have no present recollection with regard thereto. It is, apparently, one of the many judgments rendered by this Court—particu- larly in section 28 applications—where, after a full exchange of views between the Court and counsel,
3 Section 92 as amended reads:
92. The Board shall assign such members as may be required to hear and adjudicate upon grievances referred to adjudication under this Act.
it seems to be clear to all what conclusion the Court has reached and what reasoning has led it to that conclusion. In such cases, where no new legal principle is involved, not only is there no necessity to take time to prepare detailed reasons but doing so would result in delays in the disposition of section 28 applications generally that would be inconsistent with section 28(5) of the Federal Court Act. 4
Having said that, I can only add that a perusal of the record makes it clear to me that, by its judgment of January 17 last, this Court decided
(a) that the Arbitrator cannot, by his award, carry out the functions of the Committee or deputy head referred to in note 5, and that it therefore followed that his award, whereby he purported to exercise the discretion of the deputy head, had to be set aside; and
(b) that there had been breaches of the collec tive agreement (when note 6 is read with note 5) in that there had been no report of a department committee, in the case of the applicant, at the various times contemplated by note 6, uncondi tionally recommending either that he be, or be not, granted the higher rate of pay;
and, having so decided, the Court referred the matter back for a decision as to what relief should be awarded to the applicant for such breaches.
As already indicated, my view is that the section 28 application should be dismissed.
* * *
HEALD J. concurred.
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RYAN J. concurred.
Subsection (5) of section 28 reads:
28. ...
(5) An application or reference to the Court of Appeal
made under this section shall be heard and determined
without delay and in a summary way.
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