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A-384-78
Attorney General of Canada (Applicant)
v.
Gilles Giguere , (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Jackett C.J., Pratte J. and Hyde D.J.—Montreal, December 12, 1978.
Judicial review — Unemployment insurance — Reduction in working hours, and therefore, in wages — Umpire deciding reduction an interruption of earnings — Application to set aside Umpire's decision — Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28 — Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, ss. 2(1)(n), 17(2)(6), 58(r) — Employment and Immigration Reorganization Act, S.C. 1976- 77, c. 54, s. 26(7) amending s. 2(1)(n) — Unemployment Insurance Regulations, SOR/72-114, s. 148(1).
The Attorney General of Canada is challenging the decision of an Umpire who held, affirming the Board of Referees, that the respondent was entitled to the unemployment insurance benefits he was claiming. Respondent ceased to work full time for his employer on November 2, 1977, but continued to work for him on a part-time basis after that time. His wages were reduced from $125 to $25 a week. Arguing that this reduction in working hours and wages constituted an interruption of earnings, respondent claimed unemployment insurance benefits. The Commission disallowed his claim, though it was allowed by the Board of Referees and the Umpire. The Umpire's decision is the subject of review.
Held, the application is allowed. By amending section 2(1)(n) as it did, Parliament indicated its intention that not all reductions in working hours should be considered as constitut ing an "interruption in earnings", only those which resulted in a reduction in wages as prescribed by the Regulations of the Commission. It is clear that the effect of the new definition was subordinated by Parliament itself to the adoption of the appro priate regulations. In the absence of such regulations, the definition is devoid of any effect. It cannot be said that the amendment to section 2(1)(n) had the effect of making section 148(1) of the Regulations ultra vires. Even if that were the case, that would be of no help to respondent because it would still be true that the Regulations do not specify the reduction that must result from a reduction in working hours for the latter to be regarded as constituting an interruption of earnings.
APPLICATION for judicial review. COUNSEL:
J. M. Aubry for applicant. A. Collard for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
applicant.
Gauthier, Bergeron & Collard, Magog, for respondent.
The following is the English version of the reasons for judgment delivered orally by
PRATTE J.: The Attorney General of Canada is challenging the decision of an Umpire who held, affirming the Board of Referees, that respondent was entitled to the benefits he was claiming under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48.
By virtue of paragraph 17(2)(b) of the Act, an insured person is only entitled to receive unem ployment insurance benefits if he has had "an interruption of earnings from employment". On November 2, 1977 respondent ceased working for his employer full time, but he continued working for him on a part-time basis after that time, about two hours a day. His wages were reduced accord ingly, from $125 to $25 a week. Arguing that this reduction in his working hours and his wages constituted an interruption of earnings, respondent claimed unemployment insurance benefits. The Commission dismissed his claim, though it was allowed by the Board of Referees and by the Umpire. It is this decision of the Umpire which is the subject of the appeal.
It is established that respondent could not have claimed, before the Act was amended on Septem- ber 11, 1977, that he had had an interruption of earnings. At that time paragraph 2(1)(n) defined the expression "interruption of earnings" as follows:
2. (1) In this Act,
(n) "interruption of earnings" means that interruption that occurs in the earnings of an insured person when after a period of employment with an employer the insured person has a lay-off or separation from that employment;
Added to this definition, which itself indicated clearly that there could not be an interruption of an insured person's earnings unless he ceased to be in the employ of his employer, there was subsec tion 148 (1) of the Unemployment Insurance
Regulations, SOR/72-114, 1 which read in part as follows:
148. (1) ... an interruption of earnings occurs when, follow ing a period of employment with an employer, an insured person has a separation from that employment and has or will have a period of seven or more consecutive days during which no work is performed for that employer and in respect of which no earnings that arise from the employment ... are payable or allocated.
The reason the Umpire, and the Board of Referees before him, held that the reduction in respondent's working hours amounted to an inter ruption of earnings is that the Employment and Immigration Reorganization Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 54, s. 26(7), amended section 2(1)(n) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971. Since this amendment, which became effective on September 11, 1977, section 2(1) (n) reads as follows:
2. (1) In this Act,
(n) "interruption of earnings" means that interruption that occurs in the earnings of an insured person when after a period of employment with an employer the insured person has a lay-off or separation from that employment or a reduction in his hours of work for that employer resulting in a prescribed reduction in earnings;
Under this provision it is no longer necessary, in order for there to have been an interruption of earnings, that the employee ceases to be in the employ of his employer; it is sufficient for his working hours to have been reduced, provided however that such a reduction entails a reduction in earnings as "prescribed" by regulation. 2 No regulations having been adopted by the Commis sion to give effect to the amendment, the regula tions contain no provision stating what the reduc tion in earnings resulting from a reduction in working hours should be in order for such a reduc tion to constitute an interruption in earnings. The Umpire nonetheless concluded that there had been an interruption in earnings in the case at bar, for reasons which he stated as follows in his decision:
I Under section 58(r) of the Act,
58. The Commission may, with the approval of the Gover
nor in Council, make regulations
(r) defining and determining when an interruption of
earnings occurs;
2 Section 2(1)(u) provides that
2. (1) In this Act,
(u) "prescribed" means prescribed by regulation.
Section 58(r) of the Act allows the Commission to make regulations "defining and determining when an interruption of earnings occurs". The Commission did not amend section 148(1) of the Regulations to conform with the change in section 2(1)(n) of the Act.
Hence there is an anomaly, in that the Act now states that a "prescribed" reduction in earnings means an interruption of earnings, whereas the reduction in question is not prescribed in the Regulations.
If the legislator saw fit to change the definition of interrup tion of earnings, it was his intention that it be put into effect. The new definition clearly takes a more liberal approach and allows claimants to work part-time without automatic dis qualification. The Commission should therefore amend the Regulations accordingly. Now that section 2(1)(n) of the Act has been amended, section 148(1) of the Regulations is ultra vires inasmuch as it conflicts with the new definition.
I regret that I cannot concur in the opinion of the. Umpire.
By amending paragraph 2(1)(n) as it did, Par liament indicated its intention that not all reduc tions in working hours should be considered as constituting an "interruption in earnings", only those which resulted in a reduction in wages as prescribed by the Regulations of the Commission. This being the case, I feel it is clear that the effect of the new definition was subordinated by Parlia ment itself to the adoption of appropriate regula tions. In the absence of such regulations, I consider that the definition is devoid of any effect.
In the circumstances, I do not see how it can be said that the amendment to paragraph 2(1)(n) had the effect of making subsection 148 (1) of the Regulations "ultra vires". However, even if that were the case, that would be of no help to respond ent, in my opinion, because it would still be true that the Regulations do not specify the reduction that must result from a reduction in working hours for the latter to be regarded as constituting an interruption in earnings.
For these reasons, I would allow the application, quash the decision of the Umpire and refer the case back for decision on the assumption that, in the circumstances, there was no interruption of earnings from the employment of respondent.
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JACKETT C.J. concurred.
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HYDE D.J. concurred.
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