A-593-79
Minister of Employment and Immigration
(Appellant)
v.
Brendan Leeson Selby (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Thurlow C.J., Addy J. and Kerr
D.J.—Vancouver, February 11; Ottawa, March 6,
1980.
Immigration — Whether the Immigration Appeal Board in
exercising the jurisdiction conferred on it by subs. 59(1) to
hear and determine an appeal under subs. 72(1) of the Immi
gration Act, 1976 has jurisdiction to determine whether the
appellant is a permanent resident and entitled to appeal under
subs. 72(1), where, under subs. 24(2), the Adjudicator has not
been satisfied that the person concerned did not intend to
abandon Canada as his permanent residence and has accord
ingly found him to be no longer a permanent resident —
Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, ss. 2(1), 24(1),(2),
25(1),(2), 59(1), 72(1),(2),(3) — Federal Court Act, R.S.C.
1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28.
Respondent became a landed immigrant in 1966, resided in
Canada until 1971 and then went to Germany, where he
resided until 1979, when he returned to Canada. The Adjudica
tor, applying subsection 24(2) of the Immigration Act, 1976
held that respondent was not a permanent resident and made
an exclusion order against him. On an appeal to the Immigra
tion Appeal Board, the Board quashed the removal order. The
question is whether the Board has jurisdiction to determine
whether appellant is a permanent resident, and thus a person to
whom a right to appeal is given by subsection 72(1), in a case
where, under subsection 24(2), the Adjudicator has not been
satisfied that the person concerned did not intend to abandon
Canada as his place of permanent residence and has according
ly found him to be no longer a permanent resident.
Held, the appeal is dismissed. The Immigration Appeal
Board has jurisdiction to hear evidence and determine the fact
upon which the right to appeal depends. This is not affected by
subsection 24(2). When the question of intention is before the
Immigration Appeal Board, the question is to be determined
anew on the evidence brought before the Board, and the
problem posed by subsection 24(1), whether the preponderance
of the evidence favours the view that the person concerned did
not leave, or remain outside Canada, with the intention of
abandoning Canada as his place of permanent residence, is the
same whether or not the person has been absent for more than
one hundred and eighty-three days. The statute in subsection
72(1) gives to a permanent resident against whom a removal
order has been made, a right to appeal to the Immigration
Appeal Board. A person who has been granted landing and who
in fact has not left or remained outside Canada with the
intention of abandoning Canada as his place of permanent
residence is thus entitled to appeal, notwithstanding a finding
by an adjudicator that he had left or remained outside Canada
with the intention of abandoning Canada as his place of
permanent residence. Any other interpretation of subsections
24(1) and 72(1) would have the effect of making the adjudica
tor's finding on the point final and unappealable even though
subsection 59(1) gives the Board sole and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and determine all questions that may arise in relation to
the making of the removal order.
Gana v. The Minister of Manpower and Immigration
[1970] S.C.R. 699, applied. Srivastava v. Minister of
Manpower and Immigration [1973] F.C. 138, applied.
APPEAL.
COUNSEL:
G. C. Carruthers for appellant.
Rod Holloway for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
appellant.
Rod Holloway, Vancouver, for respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
THURLOW C.J.: This appeal raises the question
whether the Immigration Appeal Board, in exer
cising the jurisdiction conferred on it by subsection
59(1) to hear and determine an appeal under
subsection 72(1) of the Immigration Act, 1976,
S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, has jurisdiction to determine
whether the appellant is a permanent resident, and
thus a person to whom a right to appeal is given by
subsection 72(1), in a case where, under subsection
24(2), the adjudicator has not been satisfied that
the person concerned did not intend to abandon
Canada as his place of permanent residence and
has accordingly found him to be no longer a
permanent resident.
The relevant facts are few. The respondent
became a landed immigrant in 1966, resided in
Canada until 1971 and then went to Germany
where he resided until March 1979, when he
returned to Canada. In the meantime he had been
in Canada for about a month in the latter part of
1976. Following an inquiry held on his arrival in
Canada in March 1979, the Adjudicator, applying
subsection 24(2), held that the respondent was not
a permanent resident and made an exclusion order
against him. On an appeal to the Immigration
Appeal Board, the Board held that the respondent
had not left or remained outside Canada with the
intention of abandoning Canada as his place of
permanent residence and quashed the removal
order. Assuming that the Board had jurisdiction to
decide the question, its finding on the evidence
before it is not challenged.
The following statutory provisions are relevant:
2. (1) In this Act,
"permanent resident" means a person who
(a) has been granted landing,
(b) has not become a Canadian citizen, and
(c) has not ceased to be a permanent resident pursuant to
subsection 24(1);
24. (1) A person ceases to be a permanent resident when
(a) he leaves or remains outside Canada with the intention of
abandoning Canada as his place of permanent residence; or
(b) a deportation order has been made against him and such
order is not quashed or the execution thereof is not stayed
pursuant to subsection 75(1).
(2) Where a permanent resident is outside Canada for more
than one hundred and eighty-three days in any one twelve
month period, he shall be deemed to have abandoned Canada
as his place of permanent residence unless he satisfies an
immigration officer or an adjudicator, as the case may be, that
he did not intend to abandon Canada as his place of permanent
residence.
59. (1) There is hereby established a board, to be called the
Immigration Appeal Board, that shall, in respect of appeals
made pursuant to sections 72, 73 and 79 and in respect of
applications for redetermination made pursuant to section 70,
have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all
questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction,
that may arise in relation to the making of a removal order or
the refusal to approve an application for landing made by a
member of the family class.
72. (1) Where a removal order is made against a permanent
resident, other than a person with respect to whom a report
referred to in subsection 40(1) has been made, or against a
person lawfully in possession of a valid returning resident
permit issued to him pursuant to the regulations, that person
may appeal to the Board on either or both of the following
grounds, namely,
(a) on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or
fact, or mixed law and fact; and
(b) on the ground that, having regard to all the circum
stances of the case, the person should not be removed from
Canada.
It is, in my view, important to note that while
subsection 24(2) is concerned with loss of status it
has not been incorporated by reference into the
definition of "permanent resident" in subsection
2(1). Only subsection 24(1) has been incorporated
by reference into the definition. Subsection 24(2)
is therefore not to be read as being a part of the
definition. It is no more a part of the definition
than is section 25.' I make this point because it
was contended by counsel for the appellant that, in
substance, subsection 24(2) is part of the defini
tion and because, as it seems to me, that conten
tion was a fundamental part of his case.
The question posed by subsection 24(1) is
whether the "permanent resident" left or remained
outside Canada with the intention of abandoning
Canada as his place of permanent residence. That
is a question of fact to be assessed in the first
instance by an immigration officer faced with the
question and to be resolved at a second stage by an
adjudicator. But the statute, in subsection 72(1),
gives to a "permanent resident" against whom a
removal order has been made, a right to appeal to
the Immigration Appeal Board. A person who has
been granted landing and who in fact has not left
or remained outside Canada with the intention of
abandoning Canada as his place of permanent
residence is thus entitled to appeal, notwithstand
ing a finding by an adjudicator that he had left or
remained outside Canada with the intention of
abandoning Canada as his place of permanent
residence. Any other interpretation of subsections
24(1) and 72(1) would have the effect of making
the adjudicator's finding on the point final and
unappealable even though subsection 59(1) gives
the Immigration Appeal Board "sole and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of
law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction,
that may arise in relation to the making of a
' 25. (1) Where a permanent resident intends to leave
Canada for any period of time or is outside Canada, he may in
prescribed manner make an application to an immigration
officer for a returning resident permit.
(2) Possession by a person of a valid returning resident
permit issued to him pursuant to the regulations is, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, proof that the person did
not leave or remain outside Canada with the intention of
abandoning Canada as his place of permanent residence.
removal order" and even though under subsection
76(1) the Board, on an appeal under section 72, is
authorized to quash a removal order. I do not
think an interpretation of subsections 24(1) and
72(1) that would negate such a person's right of
appeal should be adopted. In my opinion, on an
appeal by a person against whom a removal order
has been made on the basis of a conclusion by the
adjudicator that the person is no longer a perma
nent resident because he left or remained outside
Canada with the intention of abandoning Canada
as his place of permanent residence, the Immigra
tion Appeal Board has jurisdiction to hear evi
dence and determine the fact upon which the right
to appeal depends.
This, in my opinion, is not affected by subsec
tion 24(2). It appears to me that what subsection
24(2) does is to provide a rule which the immigra
tion officer in the first instance and the adjudica
tor at the next stage are to apply in determining
whether or not status as a permanent resident has
been lost. Questions of fact, other than that of
intention of abandoning, can arise on the applica
tion of subsection 24(2). For example, there may
be an issue as to whether an absence lasted more
than one hundred and eighty-three days, or wheth
er it was within a twelve-month period. There may
be issues as to whether there was absence at all.
The legislation does not make clear an intention to
leave such issues to be finally decided by an
adjudicator any more than the issues that arise on
subsection 24(1). Nor do the words "unless he
satisfies an immigration officer or an adjudicator,
as the case may be," do any more than leave it to
their judgment at their respective stages. Indeed it
may be doubted that subsection 24(2) has any
broad application when the question of intention to
abandon is before the Immigration Appeal Board
on an appeal by the person concerned. At that
stage the question is to be determined anew on the
evidence brought before the Board, with the onus
resting on the person concerned to show that the
removal order should not have been made, and the
problem posed by subsection 24(1), whether the
preponderance of the evidence favours the view
that the person concerned did not leave or remain
outside Canada with the intention of abandoning
Canada as his place of permanent residence, is the
same whether or not the person has been absent
for more than one hundred and eighty-three days.
In weighing the evidence, the length of the absence
will have effect only to the extent that, on the
whole of the circumstances disclosed, it supports
an inference of intention to abandon. Subsection
24(2) will come into play, if at all, only when, on
the whole, the evidence is evenly balanced.
It appears to me that the contention of counsel
for the appellant that where a person has not
satisfied an immigration officer or an adjudicator,
as set out in subsection 24(2), his loss of status as
a permanent resident is concluded and he has no
right to appeal under subsection 72(1) because he
is then deemed to have abandoned, is answered by
the reasoning in Gana v. The Minister of Man
power and Immigration 2 and in Srivastava v.
Minister of Manpower and. Immigration, 3 and
particularly in the passages cited in the reasons of
Mr. Justice Addy.
Under the 1976 Act, just as under the former
Act, the immigration officer carries out an assess
ing function when dealing with a case under sub
section 24(2). But his assessment, his not being
satisfied, is not final. It does not preclude the
adjudicator in turn from forming his own view and
from being satisfied. The adjudicator performs his
function on a judicial basis but it would not give
full effect to the right of appeal provided by
subsection 72(1) to limit it to those cases in which
the adjudicator has been satisfied under subsection
24(2) and has nevertheless made a removal order,
while denying the right of appeal in cases where
the person concerned, notwithstanding that he
could not satisfy an adjudicator, is able to satisfy
the Board that he is still in fact a permanent
resident because he never left or remained outside
Canada with the intention of abandoning Canada
as his place of permanent residence.
2 [1970] S.C.R. 699.
3 [1973] F.C. 138.
I would dismiss the appeal.
* * *
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
ADDY J.: This appeal by the Minister of
Employment and Immigration involves the juris
diction granted the Immigration Appeal Board
pursuant to section 72 of the Immigration Act,
1976, to hear an appeal from the respondent
herein who at one time had been granted landing,
but who, on attempting to re-enter Canada after
an absence of more than 183 days, failed to satisfy
an Adjudicator pursuant to section 24(2), infra,
that he did not intend to abandon Canada as his
permanent place of residence.
The respondent entered this country as a landed
immigrant on the 25th of September 1966. He
resided here until approximately June or July
1971, when he left for Germany, returning to
Canada some five years later in November 1976.
He remained here for one month and left for
Germany again on the 8th of December 1976
where he remained until his return in March 1979,
whereupon the Adjudicator came to the conclusion
that he was no longer a permanent resident and
issued a removal order.
The respondent herein appealed to the Immigra
tion Appeal Board which, on hearing new evi
dence, reversed the decision of the Adjudicator
and held that he had satisfied them that he had
never intended to abandon Canada as his place of
permanent residence. The appellant before us
maintains that the Board had no jurisdiction to
reverse the Adjudicator's decision.
A permanent resident has a vested right in
Canada as section 4(1) of the Act provides that a
Canadian citizen and a permanent resident both
have a right to come into Canada and section 5
states that these are the only two categories of
persons to enjoy such a right. In order to divest a
person of a vested right the law must be clear and
unequivocal and, in the event of any ambiguity, it
must be interpreted in favour of maintaining the
existence of the right. This well-established princi
ple has been adhered to even more strictly in
recent years. On the other hand, it is equally true
that a right of appeal from the decision of any
tribunal exists only to the extent that a right of
appeal and grounds for an appeal are provided for
in a statute.
Section 2(1) of the Immigration Act, 1976
defines "permanent resident" as follows:
2. ( I ) ...
"permanent resident" means a person who
(a) has been granted landing,
(b) has not become a Canadian citizen, and
(c) has not ceased to be a permanent resident pursuant to
subsection 24(1);
In considering the word "landing" used in para
graph (a) of the definition of "permanent resi
dent," that word itself is also defined in section
2(1) as the "lawful permission to come into
Canada to establish permanent residence." From
that definition it appears that an applicant need
not actually be in Canada or have arrived in
Canada in order to be a permanent resident; this
status is obtained the moment that the permission
has been granted to come here to establish a
permanent residence. Section 9(1) provides that,
except in certain prescribed cases, the application
shall be made by an immigrant before he appears
at the port of entry. The concept is also recognized
in the wording of section 24(1) where it is stated
that a person ceases to be a permanent resident
when one "leaves or remains outside Canada ..."
and in section 24(2) where it is stated that "where
a permanent resident is outside Canada ..."
[emphasis added].
There is of course necessarily implied in the
concept of the definition of landing, the concept of
an intention on the part of the applicant to reside
permanently in Canada.
The last part of the definition of permanent
resident found in paragraph (c) above is far from
satisfactory as it incorporates the expression "per-
manent resident" in the definition of that very
expression. It also seems not only redundant but
absurd to state, as part of the definition of a legal
status, that the status exists as long as it has not
ceased to exist. I cannot help but feel that this is
not really part of the definition of the status but
merely a statement that it is not necessarily an
unalterable one, coupled with a reference to one of
the ways in which it may be forfeited.
The relevant portions of section 24 read as
follows:
24. (1) A person ceases to be a permanent resident when
(a) he leaves or remains outside Canada with the intention of
abandoning Canada as his place of permanent residence;
(2) Where a permanent resident is outside Canada for more
than one hundred and eighty-three days in any one twelve
month period, he shall be deemed to have abandoned Canada
as his place of permanent residence unless he satisfies an
immigration officer or an adjudicator, as the case may be, that
he did not intend to abandon Canada as his place of permanent
residence. [The underlining is mine.]
It was pointed out that the definition of "perma-
nent resident" in section 2(1) only refers to section
24(1) and not to section 24(2). Although subsec
tion (2) of section 24 is not made part of the
definition of permanent resident, it affects the
manner in which subsection (1) is to be applied by
imposing on any person who, on leaving Canada,
enjoyed the status of permanent resident and
whose absence from Canada has exceeded 183
days in any twelve-month period, a special onus of
establishing positively on his return that he had no
intention of abandoning Canada as his place of
permanent residence.
Section 72 reads as follows:
72. (1) Where a removal order is made against a permanent
resident, other than a person with respect to whom a report
referred to in subsection 40(1) has been made, or against a
person lawfully in possession of a valid returning resident
permit issued to him pursuant to the regulations, that person
may appeal to the Board on either or both of the following
grounds, namely,
(a) on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or
fact, or mixed law and fact; and
(b) on the ground that, having regard to all the circum
stances of the case, the person should not be removed from
Canada.
(2) Where a removal order is made against a person who
(a) has been determined by the Minister or the Board to be a
Convention refugee but is not a permanent resident, or
(b) seeks admission and at the time that a report with respect
to him was made by an immigration officer pursuant to
subsection 20(1) was in possession of a valid visa,
that person may, subject to subsection (3), appeal to the Board
on either or both of the following grounds, namely,
(c) on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or
fact, or mixed law and fact, and
(d) on the ground that, having regard to the existence of
compassionate or humanitarian considerations, the person
should not be removed from Canada.
(3) Where a deportation order is made against a person
described in paragraph (2)(a) or (b) who
(a) is a person with respect to whom a certificate referred to
in subsection 39(1) has been filed, or
(b) has been determined by an adjudicator to be a member of
an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(e), (f) or
(g),
that person may appeal to the Board on any ground of appeal
that involves a question of law or fact, or mixed law and fact.
Subsections (1) and (2) of section 72 provide for
cases where a removal order has been made and
subsection (3), where a deportation order has been
made. Removal order, by section 2(1) includes an
exclusion order as well as a deportation order.
Subsection (1) of section 72 provides for an appeal
by a permanent resident or by a person lawfully in
possession of a valid returning permit. A perma
nent resident is entitled to be issued a valid return
ing permit before leaving. However, a permanent
resident with respect to whom security or criminal
intelligence reports have been made does not pos
sess a right of appeal under this subsection. No
such impediment seems to be imposed in the case
of a person with a valid resident returning permit,
presumably because the permit would most likely
be cancelled should the intelligence activities
appear to warrant it.
Subsection (2) provides for appeals available to
a Convention refugee or to a person in possession
of a valid visa seeking admission and against
whom a report has been made by an immigration
officer who feels that he is not legally admissible.
Finally, subsection (3) applies to persons falling in
the same categories as those mentioned in subsec
tion (2) but who are the object of a deportation
order rather than an exclusion order and in respect
of whom a certificate of the Minister and the
Solicitor General has been filed based on security
or criminal intelligence reports or who has been
determined by an adjudicator to be in an inadmis
sible class as a spy, or subversive agent or a person
likely to engage in acts of violence, etc.
Specific and different grounds of appeal are
provided for in relation to the three main catego-
ries of appellants mentioned in each of these sub
sections of section 72. It must necessarily follow
that the class or category under which a particular
appellant falls must be determined by the Immi
gration Appeal Board before it can decide the
extent and nature of its jurisdiction in any particu
lar case. For an appeal to be considered under
section 72(1), the Board must satisfy itself that the
appellant falls within one of the two categories
mentioned therein, otherwise his appeal could not
be considered under that provision. The question in
such a case of determining whether a person is or
is not a permanent resident is therefore fundamen
tal to the exercise of the Board's jurisdiction.
In effect the appellant maintains that the Board
is prevented from considering whether or not a
person who was the subject of the inquiry is or is
not a permanent resident in cases where an immi
gration officer or an adjudicator has found pursu
ant to section 24(2) that he has effectively lost
that status. Even if this were true it seems clear
that in the case of a person who has not been
absent for over 183 days, there is nothing to
prevent the Board from finding that that person
has or has not lost the status of permanent resident
pursuant to section 24(1)(a).
Returning resident permits may be issued for
periods exceeding 183 days. It follows that a per
manent resident who, before leaving Canada, takes
the precaution of obtaining a returning resident
permit and who is absent for over 183 days and on
returning, is unable to convince an immigration
officer or an adjudicator that he did not intend to
abandon Canada as his permanent place of resi
dence, would nevertheless enjoy an absolute right
of appeal under section 72(1) because that section
reads: "Where a removal order is made against .. .
a person lawfully in possession of a valid returning
resident permit ... that person may appeal ...".
Therefore, if one is to follow the appellant's argu
ment to its logical conclusion, one would have to
conclude that the only permanent resident who
would be absolutely debarred from any appeal
under section 72(1) would be one who left the
country for over 183 days, who neglected to obtain
a returning resident permit before leaving and
who, on seeking to re-enter Canada, failed to
convince either an immigration officer or an
adjudicator of his continuing intention to return as
a permanent resident. Such a person would not
only be prevented from appealing under section
72(1) but in effect would be prevented from
appealing at all as he would not normally be a
Convention refugee and, since he would be pre
senting himself at the border as a person who can
enter as of right, he would not be in possession of a
visa as provided for in section 9(1). On the other
hand, the same person who would have taken the
precaution of obtaining a returning resident
permit, would still enjoy an absolute right of
appeal under section 72(1), regardless of his
actions or statements during his absence.
This narrow ground of exclusion if it is to be
justified at all, must be founded on the fact that
section 24(2) provides that the applicant for re
entry must satisfy one of two designated persons,
i.e., an immigration officer or an adjudicator, as to
his continued entitlement to the status, as opposed
to a general statement that he must positively
establish his continued entitlement, without
naming any particular person before whom that
must be established.
The argument that such a person would, in any
event, under section 28 of the Federal Court Act,
R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, be free to apply to
this Court for a review of the decision of the
immigration officer or the adjudicator, is not a
satisfactory answer, having regard to the very
limited grounds under which a decision can be set
aside pursuant to that section.
The question was dealt with to some extent by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Gana v. The
Minister of Manpower and Immigration 4 and
later by this Court in the appeal of Srivastava v.
Minister of Manpower and Immigrations. In these
cases both the law and the issues before the Court
were somewhat different, yet, they both dealt with
the point that the imposing of a specific duty on a
designated person to decide an issue would not
limit what otherwise might be considered a general
right of appeal and, to that extent, both cases are
of some assistance.
" [1970] S.C.R. 699.
5 [1973] F.C. 138.
In the Gana case Spence J., on behalf of the
Court, states at page 708 of the above-mentioned
report:
The jurisdiction of the Immigration Appeal Board is set out
in the Immigration Appeal Board Act, 1966-67 (Can.), c. 90,
in ss. 11 and 14. Section 11 provides that a person against
whom an order of deportation has been made under the provi
sions of the Immigration Act may appeal to the Board on any
ground of appeal that involves a question of law or fact or
mixed law and fact, and s. 14(c) provides that the Board may
dispose of an appeal under s. 11 or s. 12 by rendering the
decision and making the order that the Special Inquiry Officer
who presided at the hearing should have rendered and made.
The Immigration Appeal Board, therefore, had the right to
make whatever order the Special Inquiry Officer could make
and as I have pointed out, the Special Inquiry Officer, by virtue
of s. 11(2) of the Immigration Act, had authority to inquire
into and determine whether any person shall be allowed to
come into Canada or remain in Canada or be deported.
and later on at page 709:
It is said, on behalf of the Minister, that the review is
prohibited by the opening words of regulation 34(3)(/), "in the
opinion of an immigration officer". I am not of the opinion that
those words in the regulation preclude a review of that opinion
by virtue of a statutory duty put on the Special Inquiry Officer
by the various sections of the Immigration Act. In my opinion,
the words simply mean that the immigration officer is to carry
out an assessing duty not that his opinion becomes final and
conclusive protected from any review.
In the Srivastava case Jackett C.J. stated at
page 159:
In my view, the correctness of the Board's view turns on the
question whether the words "in the opinion of a Special Inquiry
Officer" were designed, as the Board seems to have thought, to
confer on such an officer some special discretion or whether
they are merely a reference, in passing, to the fact that it is
such an officer who must make the first actual decision as to
whether a person desiring to enter Canada is not only a person
who states facts that would make him an "immigrant" or
"non-immigrant" but is actually (bona fide) a person who is
what he says he is. In my opinion, the matter is concluded by
authority. I can see no distinction between the right of an
appellant to have a decision of a Special Inquiry Officer under
section 5(p) reviewed by the Immigration Appeal Board and
the right of an appellant to have a decision of an Immigration
Officer under Regulation 34(3)(/) so reviewed. That provision
made it one of the conditions to admittance for permanent
resident under Regulation 34(3) that "in the opinion of an
immigration officer" the applicant would have been so admit
ted if he had been examined outside Canada.
Section 59(1) of the Immigration Act, 1976
provides that in respect of appeals made pursuant
to section 72, the Board shall have "sole and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all
questions of law and fact, including questions of
jurisdiction that may arise in relation to the
making of a removal order ...".
Having regard to the extensive and comprehen
sive powers of appeal granted to the Board over
various categories of persons seeking admission to
Canada, I am of the view that, had Parliament
intended that an adjudicator would be the final
arbiter of the issue of whether a person such as the
respondent herein has or has not lost his status of
permanent resident together with all the rights
which that status affords, it would have done so in
clear and unequivocal language other than the
mere statement in section 24(2) that the person
must satisfy an immigration officer or an
adjudicator that he did not intend to abandon
Canada as his place of permanent residence.
For these reasons, I would hold that the Board
does have jurisdiction under section 72(1) to
reverse a decision taken by the adjudicator pursu
ant to section 24(2), denying a person who had
undoubtedly enjoyed the status of permanent resi
dent, the right to re-enter Canada as such.
Since counsel for the appellant herein admits
that the appeal is limited entirely to the question
of jurisdiction and that there is evidence on which
the Board could reasonably find that the respond
ent before us had never intended to abandon
Canada as his place of permanent residence, I
would dismiss the appeal and confirm the finding
of the Board.
* * *
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
KERR D.J.: For the reasons given by the Chief
Justice and by Addy J., I agree that the appeal
should be dismissed.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.