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A-600-80
Veronica Satchwell (Applicant) v.
Minister of Employment and Immigration (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Heald and Urie JJ. and MacKay D.J.—Toronto, October 28, 1980.
Judicial review — Immigration — Application to review and set aside Adjudicator's dismissal of application pursuant to s. 35 of Immigration Act, 1976 — Whether Adjudicator erred in refusing to reopen the inquiry on the sole basis that applicant had returned to Jamaica and was, therefore, no longer a person seeking admission to Canada — Appeal allowed — Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, ss. 32(5), 35(1), 57(2) — Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28.
APPLICATION for judicial review. COUNSEL:
M. J. Clarke for applicant. Tom James for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
M. J. Clarke, Toronto, for applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment of the Court delivered orally in English by
HEALD J.: We are all of the view that the Adjudicator was in error in refusing to reopen the inquiry on the sole basis that the applicant had returned to Jamaica and was, therefore, no longer a person seeking admission to Canada. Subsection 35(1) of the Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, empowered this Adjudicator, after the issu ance of the exclusion order, to reopen the inquiry for the hearing and receiving of additional evi dence and testimony. The exclusion order in ques tion was made under the authority of subsection 32(5) of the Act. That subsection empowers an Adjudicator to make an exclusion order in the circumstances of this case in respect of a person "who, at the time of his examination, was seeking admission ...." This applicant was, at the time of her examination in the inquiry, clearly a person
seeking admission. In our view, she continues to be a person so qualified for the purposes of reopening under subsection 35(1). Accordingly, it is our opinion that the Adjudicator erred in law in decid ing that the applicant was no longer qualified to apply for a reopening if that was the substance of his reason for refusing to reopen. If, on the other hand, the Adjudicator accepted the applicant's status to reopen, he then erred in stating that "no useful purpose could be served" by reopening. At the present time the applicant has a removal order extant against her. Pursuant to subsection 57(2) she cannot return to Canada without the Minis ter's consent for a 12-month period immediately following the day on which she left Canada. If a reopening of the inquiry were allowed and the proposed new evidence admitted, and in the fur ther event that the Adjudicator were to admit her to Canada following that reopened inquiry, she would, of course, no longer be subject to the strictures of subsection 57(2).
For these reasons, the section 28 application is allowed. The Adjudicator's refusal to reopen dated August 21, 1980 is set aside and the matter is referred back to an Adjudicator for decision on the basis that the circumstance that the applicant has returned to Jamaica is not one of the proper circumstances to be considered when making the decision whether or not to reopen under subsection 35(1).
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