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T-3363-79
Windsurfing International, Inc., and Windsurfing Sailboards Inc. (Plaintiffs)
v.
Meriah Surf Products Limited, Robert M. Lorri- man and James G. Lorriman (Defendants)
Trial Division, Jerome A.C.J.—Ottawa, May 13 and 20, 1980.
Patents — Practice — Application to strike out paragraph in statement of defence — Application to strike out counter claim because of failure by plaintiffs by counterclaim to give security for costs — First application dismissed — Order for security for costs granted — Defendants in statement of claim become plaintiffs in the counterclaim — Residency not the sole or even primary concern — Patent Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-4, s. 62 — Federal Court Rule 415(1)(b).
Wic Inc. v. La Machinerie Idéale Cie Ltée [1980] 2 F.C. 241, followed. Apotex Inc. v. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. [1980] 2 F.C. 586, followed.
MOTION. COUNSEL:
R. MacFarlane for plaintiffs. R. Dimock for defendants.
SOLICITORS:
Fitzsimmons MacFarlane & Johnson, Toronto, for plaintiffs.
Donald F. Sim, Q.C., Toronto, for defend ants.
The following are the reasons for order ren dered in English by
JEROME A.C.J.: This is an application for an order striking out paragraph 11 of the statement of defence, or in the alternative, for particulars of facts on which the defendant relies in its allegation of the condition of the mind of the plaintiffs, as required under Rule 415(1)(b) of the Federal Court Rules and for an order striking out the counterclaim on the ground that the plaintiffs by counterclaim have not provided the security pro vided under section 62(3) of the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-4, or in the alternative, for an order that the plaintiffs by counterclaim provide
security for costs in the amount of two thousand dollars ($2,000).
Paragraph 11 of the statement of defence reads as follows:
11. Prior to the commencement of this action, the Plaintiffs knew that the said Darby Sailboard device had been designed and built before the date on which the named inventors alleged ly made the invention and that the said invention had been made available to the public before the date of application for the Patent and thereby knew the Patent and each and every claim thereof was invalid and yet the Plaintiffs failed to disclaim the exclusive rights in and to the Patent. The Plaintiffs therefore recklessly and unjustly commenced this action against the Defendants, wherefore the Defendants pray that this action be dismissed as against each of them with costs on a solicitor and client scale.
At the time of service of notice of this motion, the plaintiffs also served a demand for particulars of the facts relied upon by the defendants in support of this paragraph and just prior to the hearing of this motion, the defendants delivered the required reply, so I will not deal with that aspect of the matter.
During argument, counsel for the plaintiffs conceded that the first sentence could have rele vance to the injunctive relief claimed, and there fore the application to strike out this sentence must fail. The second sentence deals only with costs which are, of course, entirely in the discretion of the Trial Judge and while it may be novel to attempt in a pleading to establish a claim for solicitor and client costs, I know of no authority which prohibits the defendant from doing so and in the absence of such authority, the application to strike out the second sentence of paragraph 11 must also fail.
The application for security for costs is some what unusual in that it relates to the position of the defendants in the capacity of plaintiffs by counterclaim. I have some reservations whether a counterclaim standing alone as an independent pleading fulfills the procedural requirements of a statement of claim in an action to impeach a patent and my acceptance of the position of the parties in this matter ought not be construed as a resolution of that broader and more interesting problem. For the purposes of this motion, however, the position of the defendants as plaintiffs by
counterclaim is not under attack and it is accepted that the declaration of invalidity sought in the statement of defence is one between the parties only, while the one sought in the counterclaim is a declaration against the world flowing from impeachment. This precise situation was con sidered by Walsh J. in Wic Inc. v. La Machinerie Idéale Cie Ltée' and I have no reason to disagree with his conclusion that the defendants in the statement of claim become plaintiffs in the coun terclaim. In the matter of security for costs, since this action falls within the terms of section 62 of the Patent Act, residency is not the sole or even the primary concern. The situation has been clearly described by Cattanach J. in Apotex Inc. v. Hoff- man-La Roche Limited 2 , in the following two excerpts:
The practice of compelling the deposit for costs is of ancient origin predicated upon a plaintiff being resident out of the jurisdiction and without property liable to be taken in execution within the jurisdiction to secure the defendant for such costs incurred and for which the plaintiff was liable ....
These considerations were not present in the enactment of subsection 62(3) of the Patent Act and accordingly the legisla tive intention must have been to deter irresponsible actions for impeachment of patents of invention.
and
Under subsection 62(3) the plaintiff in an impeachment action shall, before proceeding therein, give security for the costs of the patentee in such sum as the Court may direct. I do not think that language is susceptible of the interpretation that the Court may direct that no costs shall be deposited.
Consistent with that reasoning, I find this a proper case for an order for security for costs by the defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the application for an order striking out paragraph 11 of the statement of defence is dismissed.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defend- ants/plaintiffs by counterclaim deposit into Court within thirty days (30) from the date of this order, the sum of two thousand dollars ($2,000) as secu-
' [1980] 2 F.C. 241.
2 [1980] 2 F.C. 586, at pp. 590 and 587 respectively.
rity for the plaintiffs/defendants by counterclaim's costs herein.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be stayed pending compliance with this order.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plain- tiffs/defendants by counterclaim are to have costs of this motion in any event of the cause.
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