Judgments

Decision Information

Decision Content

A-585-82
Ho Foo Tam (Applicant) v.
Minister of Employment and Immigration (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Thurlow C.J., Heald J. and Primrose D.J.—Edmonton, October 25, 26 and 27; Ottawa, December 9, 1982.
Judicial review — Applications to review — Immigration Inquiry adjourned to allow application for Minister's permit
— Minister's decision awaited — Further adjournment denied and deportation order made — Whether delegated officer having power to deal with matter when in Minister's hands — Procedurally unfair for inquiry to proceed in circumstances — Adjudicator erred in refusing to hear submissions of counsel
— Unnecessary to deal with allegation of actual or apprehended bias — Deportation order set aside — Immigra tion Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, ss. 26(2), 27(2)(e), 28, 37, 104(2), 115(2), 123 — Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, ss. 18, 28.
Immigration — Inquiry adjourned to allow application for Minister's permit — Minister's decision awaited — Further adjournment denied and deportation order made — Deporta tion order set aside as Adjudicator's conduct manifestly unfair
— Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, ss. 19(1)(e), (2)(a), 26(2), 27(2)(e), 28, 37, 39(1), 40(1), 42(b), 83(1), 104(2), 115(2), 123.
The applicant had been ordered deported as a person who entered Canada as a visitor and remained here after ceasing to be such, contrary to paragraph 27(2)(e) of the Act. A section 28 application was brought to review and set aside the order for procedural unfairness and denial of natural justice. The inquiry had been adjourned to enable applicant to apply for a Minis ter's permit. An application, on compassionate grounds, had been made and a letter received from the Minister's office advising that he had requested a report from the appropriate officials. While the Minister's decision was awaited, a local departmental official took the position before the Adjudicator that the inquiry should proceed. The Adjudicator upheld the local official's arguments and refused an adjournment.
Held, the application should be allowed and the deportation order set aside.
Per Thurlow C.J. (Primrose D.J. concurring): Applicable to the instant case were the principles of fairness discussed by Laskin C.J.C. in Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 and by Le Dain J. in Inuit Tapirisat of Canada et al. v. His Excellen- cy the Right Honourable Jules Léger, et al., [1979] 1 F.C. 710
(C.A.). While the situation was different, the principle was the same. In the circumstances of this case, fairness required that the inquiry not be pursued until applicant had received an answer from the Minister or someone authorized by him to give it. Although the request was made directly to the Minister and was acknowledged by his office, it did not appear that the request was ever referred by the Minister for disposition by any Departmental officers delegated under section 123 to exercise the Minister's section 37 powers. Nor did it appear that the Immigration Centre Manager who forced the inquiry on was even aware of the compassionate grounds set forth in the applicant's letter to the Minister. The Court was not persuaded that a delegated officer could assume authority to deal sum marily with an application which had been made to the Minis ter himself and was in his hands for consideration. The appli cant's request for a permit had not in fact been considered by an official in a position to decide it and it was procedurally unfair to force the inquiry on while the Minister's reply was awaited.
Per Heald J.: The Adjudicator proceeded in a manifestly unfair manner in refusing to hear counsel's submissions as to the relevance of the Jiminez-Perez case and in respect of the subsection 115(2) application to the Governor in Council for relief on humanitarian grounds. In view of the error by the Adjudicator in refusing to hear counsel, it is unnecessary to deal with the issue of apprehended or actual bias. It was hard to say which participant in the proceedings made the greatest contribution to the rancorous atmosphere evident from the transcript.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED FOLLOWED:
Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311.
APPLIED:
Inuit Tapirisat of Canada et al. v. His Excellency the Right Honourable Jules Léger, et al., [1979] I F.C. 710 (C.A.).
REFERRED TO:
Ramawad v. The Minister of Manpower and Immigra tion, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 375; Louhisdon v. Employment and Immigration Canada, [1978] 2 F.C. 589 (C.A.); 01oko v. Canada Employment and Immigration et al., [1978] 2 F.C. 593 (C.A.); Jiminez-Perez et al. v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, et al., [1983] 1 F.C. 163 (C.A.); Re Mauger and Minister of Employment & Immigration (1980), 119 D.L.R. (3d) 54 (F.C.A.).
COUNSEL:
Donald Lee for applicant. Felicity Hunter for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Witten, Vogel, Binder & Lyons, Edmonton, for applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
THURLOW C.J.: This is an application under section 28 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, to review and set aside a deportation order made against the applicant on June 16, 1982. The order is attacked on grounds of procedural unfairness and failure to observe prin ciples of natural justice in that the applicant was denied an adjournment of the inquiry pending an answer to his requests on compassionate grounds made both to the Minister for a permit under section 37' of the Act and to the Governor in
' 37. (I) The Minister may issue a written permit authorizing any person to come into or remain in Canada if that person is
(a) in the case of a person seeking to come into Canada, a member of an inadmissible class, or
(b) in the case of a person in Canada, a person with respect to whom a report has been or may be made under subsection 27(2).
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (I), a permit may not be issued to
(a) a person against whom a removal order has been made who has not been removed from Canada pursuant to such an order or has not otherwise left Canada, unless an appeal from that order has been allowed;
(b) a person to whom a departure notice has been issued who has not left Canada; or
(c) a person in Canada with respect to whom an appeal made pursuant to section 79 has been dismissed.
(3) A permit shall be in force for such period of time not exceeding twelve months as is specified in the permit.
(4) The Minister may at any time, in writing, extend or cancel a permit.
(5) The Minister may, upon the cancellation or expiration of a permit, make a removal order against the person to whom the permit was issued or direct that person to leave Canada within a specified period of time.
(6) Where a person who has been directed by the Minister to leave Canada within a specified period of time fails to do so, the Minister may make a deportation order against that person.
(7) The Minister shall, within thirty days following the commencement of each fiscal year or, if Parliament is not then sitting, within the first thirty days next thereafter that Parlia ment is sitting, lay before Parliament a report specifying the
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Council for exemption under subsection 115(2) z of the Act and in that the Adjudicator displayed bias and hostility towards the applicant's counsel.
The deportation order recites that the applicant was born in Hong Kong and is a citizen of the United Kingdom and colonies. It orders him to be deported on the ground that he was a person described in paragraph 27(2)(e) of the Immigra tion Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, viz., a person other than a Canadian citizen or permanent resi dent who entered Canada as a visitor and remains therein after ceasing to be a visitor. The record discloses that the applicant came to Canada in December 1977, that he was the subject of a notice of arrest under subsection 104(2) of the Act, dated April 23, 1982, alleging he was a person described in paragraph 27(2)(e) of the Act and that under section 28 of the Act an inquiry was scheduled for April 28, 1982. It also appears that the inquiry was adjourned to May 28, 1982 and on that date further adjourned to June 15, 1982. Who it was that granted these adjournments or why the first of them was granted does not appear. With respect to the second, the Case Presenting Officer, in the course of responding to the applicant's first request on June 15, 1982 for a further adjournment, informed the Adjudicator that:
I was advised today that Mr. Tam wished to seek consideration from the Minister. In fact the inquiry was postponed previously from May 28th to this date because it was indicated upon Mr. Lee's part that this was being looked into.
On May 28, 1982, two letters had been written by or on behalf of the applicant—one addressed to
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number of permits issued during the preceding calendar year and in respect of each permit issued
(a) to a person seeking to come into Canada, the inad missible class of which that person is a member; or
(b) to a person in Canada, the applicable paragraph of subsection 27(2) pursuant to which a report has been or may be made.
'115. ...
(2) The Governor in Council may by regulation exempt any person from any regulation made under 'subsection (1) or otherwise facilitate the admission of any person where the Governor in Council is satisfied that the person should be exempted from such regulation or his admission should be facilitated for reasons of public policy or due to the existence of compassionate or humanitarian considerations.
the Governor in Council; the other to the Minister. They read:
The Governor in Council, OTTAWA, Ontario
Dear Sirs:
I am applying for an exemption pursuant to Section 115(2) of the Immigration Act, 1976, which states as follows:
"The Governor in Council may by regulation exempt any person from any regulation made under subsection (1) or otherwise facilitate the admission of any person where the Governor in Council is satisfied that the person should be exempted from such regulation or his admission should be facilitated for reasons of public policy or due to the existence of compassionate or humanitarian considerations."
My case is presently being considered by the Canada Immigra tion Centre in Edmonton, Alberta, who are refusing to allow me to remain in Canada (their file number: 4712-6993 XY).
I originally entered Canada in December of 1977 and have lived in this country since that date. During my stay in Canada, I have been able to support myself with adequate financial assistance from my parents in Hong Kong. My father is an accountant in Hong Kong and my mother is a beautician in Hong Kong and they regularly forward to me $350.00 Canadi- an per month for living expenses. I was born in Hong Kong, and have one brother who is approximately two years older, who graduated with a Bachelor of Commerce degree in Japan and one sister, who is approximately one year younger than I, and who is presently working in Hong Kong. I require until December of 1982 to complete my degree at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Alberta, in the Faculty of Arts majoring in Geography.
While there are obvious problems in my file, which would be readily apparent upon your review of it, I urge you to allow me to complete my studies here as aforesaid. My family and I will face total humiliation if I am forced to return to Hong Kong in these circumstances. My parents and I are extremely disap pointed and depressed by my present state of affairs in Canada and I humbly request that you please consider authorizing an exemption pursuant to Section 115(2) of the Immigration Act, 1976 due to the circumstances of this case, in order that I can complete my said education. I enclose herewith a copy of a letter dated May 27, 1982 from E. Reinhold, Associate Dean of The University of Alberta, Faculty of Arts, Edmonton, Alberta, advising me that I can be admitted as a probationary student. Your review of this matter is greatly appreciated.
Yours truly,
TONY HO FOO TAM End.
The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy
Minister of Employment and Immigration
House of Commons OTTAWA, Ontario
Dear Sir:
I am writing to you to apply for a Minister's Permit.
My case is presently being considered by the Canada Immigra tion Centre in Edmonton, Alberta, who are refusing to allow me to remain in Canada (their file number 4712-6993XY).
I originally entered Canada in December of 1977 and have lived in this country since that date. During my stay in Canada, I have been able to support myself with adequate financial assistance from my parents in Hong Kong. My father is an accountant in Hong Kong and my mother is a beautician in Hong Kong and they regularly forward to me $350.00 Canadi- an per month for living expenses. I was born in Hong Kong, and have one brother who is approximately two years older, who graduated with a Bachelor of Commerce degree in Japan and one sister, who is approximately one year younger than I, and who is presently working in Hong Kong. I require until December of 1982 to complete my degree at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Alberta, in the Faculty of Arts majoring in Geography.
While there are obvious problems in my file, which would be readily apparent upon your review of it, I urge you to allow me to complete my studies here as aforesaid. My family and I will face total humiliation if I am forced to return to Hong Kong in these circumstances. My parents and I are extremely disap pointed and depressed by my present state of affairs in Canada and I humbly request that you please consider authorizing a Minister's Permit for me to remain in Canada due to the circumstances of my case, to complete my said education. I enclose herewith a copy of a letter dated May 27, 1982 from E. Reinhold, Associate Dean of The University of Alberta, Facul ty of Arts, Edmonton, Alberta, advising me that I can be admitted as a probationary student. Your review of this matter is greatly appreciated.
Yours truly,
TONY HO FOO TAM. Encl.
By June 15, 1982, when the inquiry was resumed the applicant had received no reply to the letter addressed to the Governor in Council but had received a reply from the office of the Minis ter, dated June 3, 1982. It read:
Dear Mr. Tam:
The Minister, the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, has asked me to acknowledge your letter of May 28, 1982, concerning your request for a Minister's Permit.
A report will be requested from the appropriate officials and the Minister will be writing to you as soon as he has reviewed the report.
Yours sincerely,
Charles J.G. Verge Coordinator,
Secretariat Services
I should note at this point that nothing that I have found in the record indicates that the
Adjudicator, when resuming the inquiry on June 15, 1982, was aware of this correspondence. Nor does it appear that the Case Presenting Officer or the Manager of the Canada Immigration Centre at Edmonton had been aware of it. Moreover, it seems possible that the applicant's counsel as well was not aware at that time of the Minister's letter.
On resumption of the inquiry, counsel for the applicant requested an adjournment. The tran script of this portion of the proceedings is frag mentary but the following appears (addendum number 1, pages A and B):
BY ADJUDICATOR TO COUNSEL
I note that this inquiry was originally scheduled to be held on April 28th, 1982 and my diary explains that it has been rescheduled until this date.
A. Sir, I discussed with Mrs. Bacon an application I intend (to put before you with a request) to have this matter adjourned. Subject to that, I am certainly ready to proceed.
BY ADJUDICATOR TO CASE PRESENTING OFFICER
Q. Mrs. Bacon?
A. The Commission would object to an adjournment at this
time.
BY ADJUDICATOR TO COUNSEL
Q. What is your application based on Mr. Lee? What are you talking about?
A. Mr. Tam caused letters to be issued to the Governor in Council (with reference to section) 115(2) of the Immi gration Act which would authorize the Governor in Council to exempt Mr. Tam from any Regulations under the Immigration Act. This letter was sent in May, as well as a letter to the Minister of Immigration also in May, asking the Minister to please consider a Minister's Permit
under the appropriate section of the Act. ( ) Sir, we feel that based on the information contained in the letters which (would) compel considerations which are based on this case. There are a number of considerations to consid
er under the applicable ( ).
Q. ( ) can be dealt with, is that right?
A. Yes sir, We understand that the parties involved are
considering the matter ( )-
Mr. Lee, all I want is the basis of your request. (an objection to an adjournment was raised) by Mrs. Bacon.
BY ADJUDICATOR TO CASE PRESENTING OFFICER
Q. Mrs. Bacon, was this all known to you as the Minister's representative?
A. I was advised today that Mr. Tam wished to seek con sideration from the Minister. In fact the inquiry was postponed previously from May 28th to this date because it was indicated upon Mr. Lee's part that this was being looked into.
A. The Commission is objecting to an adjournment because it is felt that the issuance of a Permit is purely discretion-
ary. The authority to issue a Permit on behalf of the Minister ...
Q. Yes?
A. I have discussed the matter with the Minister's delegate, (the Manager of the Canada Immigration Centre, and she has) requested that the inquiry proceed.
Thank you.
BY ADJUDICATOR TO COUNSEL
Q. Mr. Tam and Mr. Lee ...
A. Sir, I would point out that ... (
Q. Well, this is outside my authority. You must be aware of that.
A. (From what I understand, it is) totally within your au thority to grant an adjournment.
Q. I refer you to the Regulations regarding adjournments
( ).
A. ( ) welcome that discussion. I would like to give
you the cases on the matter ( ) which would also allow you to grant an adjournment where the circum
stances are proper. ( ) simply to allow the appropri
ate authorities (time to reply to Mr. Tam's letters.)
Q. Is there anything more?
A. ( ).
RECESS
Following the recess counsel for the applicant further argued at some length that the adjourn ment should be granted, concluding, after citing the Ramawad 3 case, as follows (addendum number 1, pages D and E):
Q. Thank you. Are you suggesting that this fits your client's situation?
A. Yes sir the situation is that we have a case where we feel the Minister is still considering this situation (and if the inquiry were to continue) you could issue a deportation order depriving my client of the Minister's decision. (If the Minister) decided he can stay, it may be too late.
( ) I state clearly ( ).
BY ADJUDICATOR TO COUNSEL
(The Minister has) exercised his discretion in issuing a Permit. It has been exercised through the Minister's delegate. The Manager of the Canada Immigration Centre has the authority to issue a Permit or not to issue a permit and has decided not to issue a Permit in that case. She had not made a decision on the application made because at that point it was before the Senior Immigration Officer and there was no information that the Minister's decision had been made. Mr. Tam's case is different. The Case Presenting Officer, Mrs. Bacon, has quite adequately informed me of this. I am satisfied and we will hear no more on it.
3 Ramawad v. The Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 375.
A. Once again, ( ) say that I attempted to give this to
you, with all respect ...
Q. Please, no more!
Counsel for the applicant then presented a second application for adjournment based on a proceeding brought by the Department against the applicant in a provincial court which was to be heard the following day. On that request being denied counsel presented a third application to adjourn, this to afford him an opportunity to make an application to the Federal Court for prohibi tion. The Adjudicator's response was that unless counsel had a writ the inquiry would not be adjourned.
At that point the inquiry was recessed until the afternoon. When it was resumed counsel served the Adjudicator and the Case Presenting Officer with notice of an application to the Federal Court for prohibition and submitted that in view of this application in the interests of natural justice the matter should be adjourned until the Federal Court had had an opportunity to deal with the matter. The following appears from the transcript (pages 3, 4 and 5):
BY COUNSEL TO ADJUDICATOR
* * *
I would hope sir, that in view of this application, however, which we have just managed to get completed over the lunch hour period between the first adjournment and this adjourn ment, that you would now see fit to allow the Federal Court to have jurisdiction over the application. I would also add sir, that one item that was not put before you today because it was not available and it is part of the affidavit and also is a letter from the Minister dated June 3rd, and I have mentioned it to Mrs. Bacon whereby the Honourable Minister Mr. Axworthy has acknowledged by [sic] client's letter and has indicated sir, that a report will be requested from appropriate officials and the Minister will be writing to you as soon as he has received this report, so its [sic] obvious sir at least in my understanding of the situation that whatever the Commission here may feel, the Minister himself is still considering this matter and I'd like to show you the original of this letter which, as I say, is part of the affidavit.
A. And the letter is dated June the 3rd.
That's right sir. We've had no further correspondence from that time and I submit that that's just a further indication that something is happening and that in fact the Commission's position that no permit will be issued in the circumstances is not complete in the sense that the Minister is certainly did ... is not saying the same thing as the Commission is.
A. Mr. Lee, have you completed this presentation?
Yes sir, although I must say that this morning there were other matters that I wanted to discuss, but you have made your
rulings on those items and indicated that you were not going to entertain any further discussion, however on this matter, sir I think that the situation is quite clear and that ...
A. Very well. Thank you Mr. Lee.
BY ADJUDICATOR TO CASE PRESENTING OFFICER
Q. Mrs. Bacon, do you have comments to make on this latest development?
A. I would only say Mr. Adjudicator that at the earlier sitting of the inquiry the Commission was not aware of the fact that the Minister's officer, not the Minister personally, but the Minister's office had acknowledge [sic] receipt of Mr. Tam's correspondence. The letter itself seems to ...
Q. You're talking about the letter Mr. Tam presented? A. That's correct sir.
Q. Or Mr. Lee presented? A. Yes sir.
Q. Dated June the 3rd?
A. Yes. The letter does indicate that the Minister will be
writing to Mr. Tam.
Q. And you are unaware of that?
A. I was unaware of that at the time sir.
Q. And what does this cause? Cause you any problems? Have you changed your view point from this morning?
A. (no response)
Q. Do you wish an adjournment?
A. Mr. Adjudicator, might I have a brief recess, perhaps of
five minutes?
Q. Yes and then ... A. ... in order to ...
Q. ... we'll deal them. I've presently asked you about the comments. You've partly answered them. I will also want your comments with regards to these documents present ed by Mr. Lee and for the record,
A. (no response)
I'M GOING TO ENTER IN ONE BUNDLE AS EXHIBIT P-I THE ORIGINATING NOTICE OF MOTION AND WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN AFFIDAVIT THAT JOINS IT, AND THIS LETTER FOR EXHIBIT AND THE LETTER DATED JUNE THE 3RD TO MR. TONY HO FOO TAM IN EDMONTON FROM CHARLES J. VERGE, COORDINATOR SECRETARIAT SERVICES AND THE LETTER HEAD IS OFFICE OF THE MINISTER, AND FROM IMMIGRATION. IN ONE BUNDLE AS EXHIBIT P-I,
We will recess.
RECESS
Q. Mrs. Bacon?
A. Yes sir, first of all I would like to say I'm sorry for the delay because of the time differences between here and Ottawa, I had difficulty in contacting someone there. Mr. Adjudicator, with respect to the Motion or Originating
Notice of Motion concerning the continuation of this inquiry, the Commission does not feel that this should impede the inquiry process. I would refer to the case of Samuel Lee Nelson, a case before the Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division where the Federal Court dis missed an application for a writ of prohibition to prevent the adjudicator from continuing the inquiry when a permit was outstanding. In terms of the Commission's position as to whether or not it believes this inquiry would proceed, I would re-state my position of this morning. The Commission would object to an adjournment and does request the inquiry proceed. Thank you.
Thank you.
BY ADJUDICATOR TO COUNSEL
Mr. Lee, I have provided you with my answer to your request that I adjourn while you approach the Federal Court Trial Division this morning.
A. Sir as I recall, the reason that struck me as being most cogent in your mind was that the Commission was saying that in fact there would be no consideration given to our application. Now the Commission seems to ... the writ ten evidence is certainly clear and now even in ... in the submissions that have been made by learned friend, Mrs. Bacon, the position seems to have changed somewhat. They're not taking the hard line that they were this morning where they indicated categorically that ... that there would be no consideration given. I believe sir that you're [sic] reasoning was predicated on the fact that there was a difference between the case that I had referred you to and the case that Mr....
Mr. Lee please, Mr. Lee.
BY ADJUDICATOR TO CASE PRESENTING OFFICER
Q. Mrs. Bacon, your position is that as the Minister's repre sentative that you seek that the inquiry proceed at this time?
A. That is correct sir, as I indicated this morning, the Minister's discretion in the issuance of the Permit has been exercised. It has been exercised by his delegate the Manager of this office and I do have ... you would want it entered for the record, a memo from the Manager to the Case Presenting Unit requesting that the inquiry proceed.
I don't believe I need it. I've asked you your view point as the Minister's representative.
BY ADJUDICATOR TO COUNSEL
Mr. Lee, possibly I'm under a misapprehension that I haven't explained to you - with regard to your request for an adjourn ment while you ... your client approaches the Federal Court Trial Division for an order prohibiting me from proceeding. I expressed this morning that unless you had a writ, an order from the court and I explained to you that in my view it would be more correct procedure on your part to await my decision. To adopt a different view is to adopt that you could stop every inquiry by merely making an application to the court. I am not going to grant your request for an adjournment. We have been underway considerable time and it has been spent with you
[sic] objections and requests for adjournment. This inquiry will proceed.
A. Sir if I might speak on this issue ...
Q. Are you arguing with what I said?
A. I am making submissions sir. Are you suggesting that I
cannot make submissions?
Q. No, I'm not going to entertain further argument Mr. Lee. A. That's fine sir.
Q. Have you something new? A. Well I feel that ...
Q. Have you something new? A. Well I feel ...
Q. Something new?
A. ... I have something new sir.
Q. Have you a new reason for requesting an adjournment? A. Well, I was simply going to say sir, ...
Q. Mr. Lee, answer my question. A. Yes sir ...
Q. Have you a new reason for requesting an adjournment?
A. Sir with all respect, if there ... throughout the course of these proceedings...
Q. Mr. Lee ...
A. ...lfeel...
Q. ... although you say with all due respect, you just continue in defiance of my request to proceed. The requests you have made for an adjournment are denied.
A. (no response)
The foregoing exposes the basis for what appears to me to be the most serious of the many points raised on behalf of the applicant. The case is not simply one in which a request for a Minis ter's permit is made before or during an inquiry and an adjournment is then demanded to await a reply. Vide Louhisdon v. Employment and Immi gration Canada 4 and Oloko v. Canada Employ ment and Immigration et al. 5 It is a case in which an inquiry had been adjourned to enable the person concerned to apply for a Minister's permit, the application had been made to the Minister at Ottawa citing compassionate grounds for consider ation, the Minister's office had acknowledged the request and promised a reply after receiving a report and the reply had not yet been received.
° [1978] 2 F.C. 589 (C.A.). 5 [1978] 2 F.C. 593 (C.A.).
Moreover, so far as appears it has never been received.
In these circumstances, can it be said that the procedure followed by the Department was fair to the applicant when on June 15, 1982 while the applicant was still awaiting the Minister's prom ised reply a local departmental official insisted that the inquiry, the result of which would prob ably be to deprive the Minister of his authority to grant a permit, should proceed and not be adjourned.
The principles to be applied appear from the following passages from the judgment of Laskin C.J.C., in Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police: 6
In short, 1 am of the opinion that although the appellant clearly cannot claim the procedural protections afforded to a constable with more than eighteen months' service, he cannot be denied any protection. He should be treated "fairly" not arbitrarily. I accept, therefore, for present purposes and as a common law principle what Megarry J. accepted in Bates v. Lord Hallsham ([1972] 1 W.L.R. 1373), at p. 1378, "that in the sphere of the so-called quasi-judicial the rules of natural justice run, and that in the administrative or executive field there is a general duty of fairness".
In my opinion, the appellant should have been told why his services were no longer required and given an opportunity, whether orally or in writing as the Board might determine, to respond. The Board itself, I would think, would wish to be certain that it had not made a mistake in some fact or circumstance which it deemed relevant to its determination. Once it had the appellant's response, it would be for the Board to decide on what action to take, without its decision being reviewable elsewhere, always premising good faith. Such a course provides fairness to the appellant, and it is fair as well to the Board's right, as a public authority to decide, once it had the appellant's response, whether a person in his position should be allowed to continue in office to the point where his right to procedural protection was enlarged. Status in office deserves this minimal protection, however brief the period for which the office is held.
and from the judgment of Le Dain J., in Inuit Tapirisat of Canada et al. v. His Excellency the Right Honourable Jules Léger, et al.: 7
Procedural fairness, like natural justice, is a common law requirement that is applied as a matter of statutory interpreta tion. In the absence of express procedural provisions it must be found to be impliedly required by the statute. It is necessary to consider the legislative context of the power as a whole. What is
6 [1979] 1 S.C.R: 31 1 at pp. 324 and 328. 7 [1979] 1 F.C. 710 (C.A.) at p. 717.
really in issue is what it is appropriate to require of a particular authority in the way of procedure, given the nature of the authority, the nature of the power exercised by it, and the consequences of the power for the individuals affected. The requirements of fairness must be balanced by the needs of the administrative process in question.
In general, the cases on this subject deal with situations raising the question of the extent of the right of the person affected by a decision to be heard. This case differs in that respect. Here the case is one of an official insisting on a course that would stultify an application which the applicant had been given an opportunity to make and which he had made on grounds that could be considered for the purposes of section 37 but which could not be considered in the course of the inquiry on which the official insisted. But while the situation is different the principle to be applied is the same. The official, even if exercising a purely administra tive power, must act fairly.
In my opinion, the procedure adopted by the Department was lacking in fairness. One may assume, because it is irrelevant, that the applicant had overstayed, that he was subject to deportation and that he had nothing to put before the Adjudicator in answer to the allegation. Even so, he was entitled to procedural fairness at the hands of the Department when dealing with him. In my opinion, having had the inquiry adjourned on May 28, 1982 for the purpose of enabling him to apply to the Minister and having received the Minister's undertaking to write him after receiving a report, fairness required that the inquiry not be pursued until he had been given an answer by the Minister or by someone in the Department authorized by the Minister to give it for him.
It is, I think, important to recall that the appli cant's request was not made to a local official to whom authority to exercise the Minister's powers under section 37 had been delegated under section
123. 8 The request was made directly to the Minis ter. It was acknowledged directly by the Minister's office by a letter that promised that the Minister would write to him in reply. No reply ever came from that source. Nor does it appear that the applicant's request was ever referred by the Minis ter to be dealt with or answered by any of the Department's officers delegated under section 123 to exercise the Minister's powers under section 37. It does not even appear that the Manager of the Canada Immigration Centre who forced the con tinuance of the inquiry was aware of or ever considered the compassionate grounds for a permit put forward by the applicant in his letter to the Minister. All that does appear in that respect is that at the morning session on June 15, 1982, the Case Presenting Officer stated that the officer in question, who is said to be a delegated officer but who apparently was not then aware of the appli cant's request to the Minister or of the grounds for the request or of the Minister's reply, had exer cised the Minister's discretion and had insisted both in the forenoon, and in the afternoon after learning of the Minister's letter, that the inquiry proceed.
I can understand a delegated officer exercising the Minister's powers in respect of an application made at the immigration office where he serves. I can understand such an officer dealing with an application which, though made elsewhere, has been referred to his office for disposition. I am not persuaded that it lies within the authority of such a delegated officer in one place to assume, on his own, authority over and deal summarily with an application made at another office perhaps several thousand miles away. Nothing in the record dis -
8 123. The Minister or the Deputy Minister, as the case may be, may authorize such persons employed in the public service of Canada as he deems proper to exercise and perform any of the powers, duties and functions that may or are required to be exercised or performed by him under this Act or the regula tions, other than the powers, duties and functions referred to in paragraphs 19(1)(e) and 19(2)(a), subsections 39(1) and 40(I), paragraph 42(b) and subsection 83(1), and any such duty, power or function performed or exercised by any person so authorized shall be deemed to have been performed or exercised by the Minister or Deputy Minister, as the case may be.
closes that the Manager of the Canada Immigra tion Centre at Edmonton had, without more, au thority to deal with and refuse a request made directly to the Minister and which, as his letter shows, was in his hands for consideration.
Moreover, nothing in the record, as I read it, discloses that any written or oral answer to the application for a permit was given to the applicant even by that official. What, as it seems to me, occurred was that the officer simply insisted on an inquiry proceeding which, if it resulted in a depor tation order, would put an end to the application for a permit. Even the document tendered by the Case Presenting Officer and declined by the Adjudicator, as described by the former, was not a reply to the application for a permit. It was described as a memo requesting that the inquiry proceed. I am accordingly of the view that the applicant's request for a permit had not in fact been considered by an official in a position to decide it and that it was procedurally unfair to force the inquiry to a conclusion while the appli cant still awaited the reply which the Minister had promised.
In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary for me to consider further or to deal with the other points raised.
I would set aside the deportation order.
PRIMROSE D.J.: I concur.
* * *
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
HEALD J.: This is a section 28 application to review and set aside the deportation order made against the applicant by Adjudicator, E. C. Berry, on June 16, 1982. The deportation order was made on the basis that the applicant was a person described in paragraph 27(2)(e) of the Immigra tion Act, 1976, in that he was a person in Canada other than a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident who entered Canada as a visitor and remained therein after ceasing to be a visitor because he remained in Canada for a period of
time longer than that for which he was authorized to remain in Canada. The evidence taken at the inquiry established that the applicant, a native of Hong Kong, first entered Canada at Vancouver on December 20, 1977. He was not asked how long he intended to stay in Canada by the immigration officer nor was there any notation on his passport as to the length of stay granted to him. The Adjudicator pointed out, correctly in my view, that pursuant to the provisions of subsection 26(2) of the Act, a visitor is not authorized to remain in Canada for a period in excess of three months from the day on which he was granted entry unless "... otherwise specified in writing by an immigra tion officer or an adjudicator ...". The evidence also established that the applicant had never applied for any further extensions and the Adjudicator held that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, he was entitled to conclude that the applicant had not left Canada at any time since he was present at the inquiry. 9 On this basis he went on to find that the applicant had remained in Canada after ceasing to be a visitor and was, accordingly, a person described in paragraph 27(2)(e) of the Immigration Act, 1976.
The events of significance leading up to the inquiry and the issuance of the deportation order were as follows. The applicant was arrested on April 23, 1982 pursuant to section 104 of the Immigration Act, 1976. He was originally sum moned to inquiry on April 28, 1982, the inquiry was adjourned to May 28, 1982 and again adjourned on that date to June 15, 1982. The inquiry opened on June 15, in the presence of the applicant and his counsel and proceeded on that day from approximately 9 a.m. until approximate ly 5 p.m., with a recess for lunch and two short recesses during the course of the afternoon pro ceedings. At approximately 5 p.m., the inquiry was adjourned to 1 p.m. the following day June 16, 1982 and completed that afternoon when the deportation order was issued.
Counsel for the applicant attacks subject depor tation order on two principal grounds: firstly, that there was procedural unfairness and a denial of
9 The Adjudicator made these findings based on the entries in the applicant's passport and on the evidence of immigration officer Haist who had conversed with the applicant. The appli cant, on the advice of counsel, declined to give evidence at the inquiry.
natural justice in the Adjudicator's conduct throughout the course of the inquiry proceedings and, secondly, that the Adjudicator throughout the course of the inquiry conducted himself with open hostility towards applicant's counsel so as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias or actual bias sufficient to vitiate the proceedings and the deportation order which he issued at the conclu sion thereof.
Dealing with the initial attack referred to supra, this submission is based on the Adjudicator's refusal to grant the request of applicant's counsel to adjourn the inquiry proceedings in the following circumstances. On May 28, 1982, the applicant wrote to the Minister of Employment and Immi gration and in that letter, he applied for a Minis ter's permit, asking that he be allowed to remain in Canada until December of 1982 when he expected to complete his degree at the University of Alber- ta, Edmonton, in the Faculty of Arts majoring in Geography. Although the statutory basis for the issuance of the Minister's permit is not specifically referred to in the letter, it is common ground that the Minister had authority to issue such a permit pursuant to the provisions of subsection 37(1) of the Immigration Act, 1976. 10 The applicant wrote another letter, also on May 28, 1982, to the Gover nor in Council, Ottawa, Ontario, relating in almost identical language, the circumstances of his case asking that the Governor in Council grant him an exception pursuant to the provisions of subsection 115(2) of the Immigration Act, 1976. That subsec tion was specifically referred to and quoted in the letter and reads as follows:
115....
(2) The Governor in Council may by regulation exempt any person from any regulation made under subsection (1) or otherwise facilitate the admission of any person where the Governor in Council is satisfied that the person should be exempted from such regulation or his admission should be
10 Subsection 37(1) reads as follows:
37. (1) The Minister may issue a written permit authoriz ing any person to come into or remain in Canada if that person is
(a) in the case of a person seeking to come into Canada, a member of an inadmissible class, or
(b) in the case of a person in Canada, a person with respect to whom a report has been or may be made under subsection 27(2).
facilitated for reasons of public policy or due to the existence of compassionate or humanitarian considerations.
When the inquiry opened on June 15, 1982, the applicant's position was that he had not received any reply to his May 28 letter to the Governor in Council. He had, however, received a reply to his letter of the same date to the Minister. The reply was dated June 3, 1982 and was signed by one Charles J. G. Verge, described as "Coordinator, Secretariat Services" in the Minister's Office in Ottawa. That letter reads as follows (transcript, page 52):
The Minister, the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, has asked me to acknowledge your letter of May 28, 1982, concerning your request for a Minister's Permit.
A report will be requested from the appropriate officials and the Minister will be writing to you as soon as he has reviewed the report.
Accordingly, almost immediately after the Ad judicator opened the inquiry, applicant's counsel applied for an adjournment of the inquiry because no answer of any kind had been received in reply to the subsection 115(2) exemption application and no definitive answer to the section 37 permit application had been received. The Case Present ing Officer, representing the Commission, objected to the adjournment application on the following basis (transcript addendum number 1, page B):"
The Commission is objecting to an adjournment because it is felt that the issuance of a Permit is purely discretionary ....
I have discussed the matter with the Minister's delegate, (the Manager of the• Canada Immigration Centre, and she has) requested that the inquiry proceed.
The Adjudicator refused the adjournment request because, in his view, the Minister's discretion to issue a permit under section 37 had been exercised
11 Page 2 of the Inquiry Transcript contains the following entry almost immediately after the inquiry opening on June 15
"45 MINUTES OF INQUIRY NOT AVAILABLE DUE TO TAPE MALFUNCTION SEE ADDENDUM NO. I." Addendum No. 1 containing Pages A to E inclusive is described as "PARTIAL PORTION OF TRANSCRIPT RELATING TO THE MISSING SEC TION IN THE RECORD OF THE IMMIGRATION INQUIRY ... TRANSCRIBED FROM INCOMPLETE NOTES TAKING (sic) DURING THE INQUIRY." It was common ground between the parties that Pages A to E supra were not, by any means, a full and complete transcript of the missing 45-minute portion.
through his delegate, the Manager of the Canada Immigration Centre who had decided not to issue a permit in this case (see addendum to transcript, page D).
After the luncheon adjournment, applicant's counsel advised the Adjudicator that an originat ing notice of motion under section 18 of the Fed eral Court Act to the Trial Division asking for prohibition of the proceedings before the Adjudicator until the outcome of the section 37 and subsection 115(2) applications were known, had been issued and on this basis, he renewed his application for an adjournment of the proceedings. After a short recess, the Case Presenting Officer objected to the adjournment at the same time reiterating her earlier position that the Minister's delegate had refused the section 37 permit applica tion. The Adjudicator thereupon again refused the adjournment requested by applicant's counsel. The inquiry then proceeded. As stated earlier herein, the applicant declined to give evidence, on the advice of counsel. However, the Case Presenting Officer then called immigration officer Haist and established the Commission's allegations, to the satisfaction of the Adjudicator, through her evi dence. After hearing that sworn testimony and the submissions of the Case Presenting Officer, the Adjudicator asked the applicant's counsel whether he had any evidence to submit on behalf of the applicant. At that point counsel once again raised the matter of the subsection 115(2) application and referred to the Jiminez-Perez case. 12 In this regard, the transcript reads as follows (pages 21, 22 and 23):
A. The other thing ... the other matter I would put to you sir is that the Perez case and the whole aspect of 115(2) in terms of even your discussion hasn't been ...
Q. Perez is a case you haven't viewed.
A. That's ... well I ... I've received some briefing on it.
Q. All right then we'll adjourn at this point. You may read the Perez case and then continue.
A. Yes but the record sir should be clear that we haven't discussed 115(2). We talk about the Minister but the
2 Jiminez-Perez et al. v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, et al., [1983] 1 F.C. 163 (C.A.)
Minister was only asked under section 37. The ... the issue of 115(2) has never been resolved either by the Commission or by yourself.
Mr. Lee it is outside the bounds of my authority to grant such an adjournment. I rely on the Minister's representa tive for the Minister's view point. This inquiry stands adjourned for fifteen minutes.
R EC ESS
This inquiry is resumed. Mr. Lee you have had a copy of the decision in question. I earlier indicated to you I was somewhat familiar with the case and I point out to you it is ... I am required to respect, to pay attention to case law, and I read this case once again and it refreshes my memory that it is of no assistance to your client. It doesn't deal with the same situation at all.
A. I might reply to that.
Yes please speak.
A. Although prior to that sir, I was making certain remarks arising out of your comments and there was one further point that I hadn't finished when you had given the final adjournment, and that is sir that you were pointing out to us that it was up to you to be satisfied as to ...
Mr. Lee, I'm going to cut you off, because I'm not here to argue with you. Once I make a finding then that subject is closed and I don't intend to fill record and time with your remarks that have no bearing on the issues before me ...
A. Sir I believe you were the one who felt it was important to make some general comments concerning your role and I simply ...
Mr. Lee I happen to be the adjudicator. I have reminded you of your responsibility. I'm going to proceed.
Q. Do you have evidence to present on behalf of your client with regard to the issues I am required to deal with at this inquiry?
A. I have submissions that I would like to make sir.
Q. Do you have evidence? A. (no response)
Q. Are you unable to answer a question yes or no Mr. Lee? A. Sir I'm not prepared to answer questions when they are
Q. Then you refuse to answer.
A. I'm not ... I didn't say that sir. I simply indicated that I'm not prepared to answer questions in the manner in which you are putting them forward. I am simply indicat ing to you that I have some relevant submissions ...
Q. Mr. Lee do you understand my question? A. NoI...
Q. Do you understand my questions? A. No quite frankly I do not sir.
Q. Do you have evidence ... do you have evidence to present
on behalf of your client?
A. I feel I have ...
Q. With regard to the issues I must decide? A. I feel I have.
Q. Then please proceed with your evidence. A. Well I was just pointing out to you sir ..
Q. Submission is not evidence Mr. Lee.
A. I think sir you asked for evidence concerning matters that were on issues that you had to decide and I think the evidence I'm bringing forward here to you ...
Q. Do you recall what the issues of this inquiry are?
A. Sir I haven't even given you what my submission is. I'm not sure how you can tell with all respect, whether its [sic] evidence or relevant or irrelevant.
Q. There has been a witness to the inquiry. Immigration Officer Haist has been examined by the Minister's repre sentative. Now you earlier said you had no questions of Miss Haist. Miss Haist has not been excused by me as a witness. She is, I am informed she is available. Do you have questions you wish to place to the Witness Haist?
A. No sir but I have submissions to make based on the case that you asked me to read during the adjournments and that I raised to you prior to the adjournment and I also have some submissions arising out of the last comments that you had made prior to the adjournment. I believe sir, that you were inviting me to make those submissions and I had not finished.
Q. Just a moment Mr. Lee. You have said that you have no questions of Officer Haist. Do you have evidence to present on behalf of your client?
A. I have no witnesses to call sir.
Q. Is your client prepared to answer questions?
A. I have indicated sir that my client is not a compellable witness based on the cases that you have referred to and that I have referred to and the Charter sir and therefore
Q. Once again ...
A. because he is not compellable ...
Q. ... Once again I will ask for a yes or a no answer. Is your client prepared to testify at this inquiry?
A. As my client is not compellable sir, he is not .. .
From this passage, it is clear that notwithstanding the fifteen-minute adjournment granted for the purpose of allowing applicant's counsel to peruse the Jiminez-Perez decision, on the resumption of
the inquiry, the Adjudicator did not allow counsel to make the submissions which he wished to make on the applicability of that decision to the instant case. Rather, he proceeded to hear further submis sions from the Case Presenting Officer. Thereafter applicant's counsel attempted once more to raise the subsection 115(2) issue and to make his sub missions on the Jiminez-Perez decision. At page 25 of the transcript, the following exchange occurred between the Adjudicator and applicant's counsel:
Q. Do you have a submission to make with regard to the evidence presented concerning the issues of this inquiry: Is Mr. Tam a person described in paragraph 27(2)(e). Yes or no I have asked you.
A. Sir I would also point out that you have given us the case of Perez that I had raised and you have indicated that we would be allowed to make submissions ...
Mr. Tam...
A. concerning it ...
BY ADJUDICATOR TO PERSON CONCERNED
Mr. Tam, I will no longer hear your counsel in this vein.
Thereafter the Adjudicator proceeded to address himself to the central issue in the proceedings, i.e., whether or not the applicant was a person described in paragraph 27(2)(e) of the Act.
On the basis of this record, I am satisfied that the Adjudicator did not act properly in refusing to allow applicant's counsel an opportunity to make submissions with respect to the subsection 115(2) application. After allowing counsel a short adjournment to consider the relevance of the Jiminez-Perez decision, he then refused to hear counsel's submissions thereon, simply stating " .. . I read this case once again and it refreshes my memory that it is of no assistance to your client." When counsel tried later on in the proceedings to make his submissions on this issue, he was sum marily silenced with the statement: "Mr. Tam, I will no longer hear your counsel in this vein." The Adjudicator clearly, in my view, by these actions, denied the applicant natural justice and procedural fairness. Whether or not the Jiminez-Perez deci sion was relevant to the case at bar, applicant's counsel was most certainly entitled to make his submissions on the relevance of that case together with any other submissions which he considered relevant to the issue at hand. In making a sum-
mary ruling that the Jiminez-Perez case was inap plicable without hearing what counsel had to say to persuade him otherwise is to proceed in a manner which, in my view, was manifestly unfair. I agree that applicant's counsel contributed, to some extent, to the situation, by failing, in some instances, to be directly responsive to questions directed to him by the Adjudicator. However that may be, the fact remains that on at least five different occasions' 3 the applicant's counsel raised the matter of the subsection 115(2) application with the Adjudicator and never, on any of those occasions, was he allowed to make his submissions in respect thereof. I am satisfied that counsel was attempting to raise a serious issue. I am not as confident as the Adjudicator appeared to be that the Jiminez-Perez case had no relevance to the circumstances at bar. Without expressly stating any concluded view on the impact, if any, of other jurisprudence of this Court 14 on the present case, I think the Adjudicator should have given counsel an opportunity, at some point during the course of the proceedings, to make the submissions which he clearly wished to make on the question of the subsection 115(2) application to the Governor in Council.
Turning now to the second attack by applicant's counsel on subject deportation order relating to a reasonable apprehension of bias or actual bias, we were given a number of references to the transcript where, in his submission, the remarks of the Adjudicator to counsel clearly revealed an open hostility on the part of the Adjudicator towards counsel. I agree that in many instances the remarks made by the Adjudicator were intemper ate and might perhaps have been better left unsaid. However, it is difficult for a Court sitting in review of quasi-judicial proceedings like this to recapture the true atmosphere of the proceedings assisted only by a written transcript (which in this case is by no means a complete transcript). In fairness to the Adjudicator, it is clear from the transcript that he became exasperated by what he
13 See addendum no. 1 to transcript, p. B; p. 2; pp. 18-19; pp. 21-23 quoted supra; and p. 25 quoted supra.
14 1 refer to the Jiminez-Perez case (supra) and the case of Re Mauger and Minister of Employment & Immigration (1980), 119 D.L.R. (3d) 54 (F.C.A.) at p. 76.
considered to be delaying tactics on the part of counsel and by counsel's attempt to introduce into the proceedings matters which, in the view of the Adjudicator, were irrelevant to the issue which he was required to determine. Unfortunately, the Adjudicator erred, in my view, in refusing to hear applicant's counsel on the subsection 115(2) matter. Because of my conclusions on the initial ground of attack advanced on behalf of the appli cant, it is unnecessary to deal definitively with the submissions in respect of reasonable apprehension of bias or actual bias. I feel constrained to add, however, that I have rarely perused a more unpleasant transcript. I am frankly relieved that it is neither necessary nor desirable that a judgment be made as to which participant in the proceedings contributed to the greatest extent to the rancorous atmosphere which pervaded from beginning to end.
For the reasons expressed herein, I would allow the section 28 application and set aside the depor tation order made against this applicant on June 16, 1982 by Adjudicator, E. C. Berry.
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