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T-1217-86
Ermineskin Band Council (Applicant) v.
L. G. Smith, Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Raymond John Quinn, Laura Rowan Quinn, Nadine Rae Quinn, Raymond Quinn, Virgel Shawn Quinn and Bonita Cheryl Quinn (Respondents)
INDEXED AS: ERMINESKIN BAND COUNCIL V. CANADA (REG- ISTRAR, INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS)
Trial Division, Strayer J.—Vancouver, June 2 and 5, 1986.
Judicial review — Prerogative writs — Mandamus — Application for mandamus requiring Registrar to render deci sion upon two protests by Band Council against additions to Band List — Registrar not rendering decision re: first protest, made September 21, 1984, as of opinion amendments to Indian Act precluding success of protest and suggesting Band Council use new protest provisions — Second protest within new s. 14.2 made January 21, 1986 — No decision yet rendered — Evidence disclosing clear demand made for exercise of non- discretionary power — Delay in making decision tantamount to refusal to decide — Duty on Registrar to render decision under s. 14.2(5) — Registrar's decision subject to appeal to court — Failure to render decision preventing appeal to court of his interpretation of law — Right of appeal not disappear ing because no possibility of success — Registrar ordered to render decision forthwith as to second protest — Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-6, ss. 9(2) (as am. by S.C. 1985, c. 27, s. 4), 11(1)(a) (as am. idem), (c), 14.2 (as enacted idem), 14.3 (as am. idem).
Native Peoples — Registration — Registrar deciding respondents entitled to registration as members of Ermineskin Band — Band Council adopting resolution protesting decision
— Protest sent to Registrar — No decision rendered — Registrar advising no remedy due to Indian Act amendments — Suggesting Band Council use new s. 14.2 protest provisions
— New protest made — Registrar still not making decision — Delay equivalent to refusal to decide — Registrar's decision appealable to court — By not deciding, Registrar preventing judicial ruling on his interpretation of law — Registrar under duty to decide re second protest — Ordered to render decision forthwith — Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-6, ss. 9(2) (as am.
by S.C. 1985, c. 27, s. 4), 11(1)(a) (as am. idem), (c), 14.2 (as enacted idem), 14.3 (as am. idem).
COUNSEL:
I. S. Nossal for applicant.
A. D. Louie for respondent L. G. Smith, Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada.
No one appearing for respondents Raymond John Quinn, Laura Rowan Quinn, Nadine Rae Quinn, Raymond Quinn, Virgel Shawn Quinn and Bonita Cheryl Quinn.
SOLICITORS:
Davis & Company, Vancouver, for applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent L. G. Smith, Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada.
Roddick & Peck, Edmonton, for respondents Raymond John Quinn, Laura Rowan Quinn, Nadine Rae Quinn, Raymond Quinn, Virgel Shawn Quinn and Bonita Cheryl Quinn.
The following are the reasons for order ren dered in English by
STRAYER J.: This is an application for man- damus to require the respondent Registrar to render a decision with respect to two protests by the applicant Band Council, dated September 21, 1984 and January 21, 1986 objecting to the addi tion to the Ermineskin Band List of the individual respondents, members of the Quinn family. The Quinns did not appear at the hearing of this application, but counsel for the applicant advised that their counsel had been served and that he had indicated that his clients supported this applica tion.
The facts are not in dispute. The individual respondents were, by a decision of the Registrar of July 31, 1984, found to be entitled to be registered as members of the Ermineskin Band pursuant to paragraph 11(1)(c) of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-6. The first protest was adopted by an Ermineskin Band Council resolution on September 21, 1984 and forwarded to the Registrar. No decision has ever been rendered by the Registrar with respect to that protest.
The relevant sections of the Indian Act then applicable were amended by S.C. 1985, c. 27, s. 4 which was deemed to come into force on April 17, 1985, (apparently to coincide with the coming into force of section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [being Part I of the Consti tution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)]). These amendments replaced sections 5 to 14 of the Indian Act making substan tial changes with respect to entitlement and proce dure for registration as Indians and as band members.
Counsel for the applicant continued to press the Registrar for a decision with respect to its protest against the registration of the Quinns as band members. By letter dated December 20, 1985 the respondent Registrar advised counsel for the appli cant that in his view, by virtue of the amendments to the Indian Act, any person who was on a Band List prior to April 17, 1985 was entitled to be a band member and, therefore, with respect to pro tests entered prior to April 17, 1985 "the remedy has ceased to exist" because such persons could not be removed. He stated that even if he upheld the protest of September 21, 1984 he would have no power to remove the names of the individual respondents from the Band List. He made it clear in his letter that he was not rendering a decision with respect to the protest that was filed prior to the coming into force of the amendment. He did, however, suggest that the Band Council could use the protest provisions under the new section 14.2 adopted as part of the amendments. With minor changes, those protest provisions in the section are basically similar to the previous ones found in subsection 9(2) of R.S.C. 1970, c. I-6.
Acting on this suggestion, the applicant Band Council adopted a new resolution on January 21, 1986 protesting against the addition in July, 1984, of the individual respondents to the Band List. The Registrar has so far failed to take a decision with respect to this protest in spite of letters dated February 7, 1986 and March 18, 1986 from coun sel for the applicant herein requesting that he do so.
There are two basic issues which I must deter mine in deciding whether to grant mandamus: whether there is a clear duty, not subject to his discretion, on the Registrar to render a decision on either or both of these protests; and if so, whether a clear demand has been made for him to perform this duty which has been refused. I shall deal with the second question first.
It appears to me that the correspondence, namely the letter from the applicant's counsel to the Registrar of December 20, 1985 does not disclose a clear demand simply to make a decision with respect to the first protest. The key sentence is:
The Band has instructed us that, unless a decision is made no later than January 10th to delete Mr. Quinn, his wife and familÿ from the Band List and to reimburse the Band for all payments made to them out of Band funds, the Band will commence action to obtain a court order to that effect.
This is not simply a demand to make a decision, but rather a demand that the Registrar exercise his powers in a particular way. Not even the applicant argues that it had a right to demand a particular decision: it only argues that it has a right to some decision. Further, this demand appears to have been withdrawn by a letter from the Band's lawyer of March 18, 1986 in which he says that:
Further to our letter of February 7 enclosing a new protest, we advise that, unless a decision is made by you on that protest no later than the end of this month, the Band will be compelled to seek a court order to obtain a decision.
This is a clear and unambiguous demand for the exercise of a non-discretionary power. While there has been no express rejection of this demand, more than enough time has passed for a response and none has been forthcoming. This is tantamount to a refusal to decide. I shall therefore deal with this application for mandamus as being properly in relation to the second protest adopted on January 21, 1986.
The remaining question, then, is whether a duty lies on the Registrar to render a decision in rela-
tion to the second protest. I have concluded that it does. I believe the Registrar has, in the position which he has asserted to the applicant, confused two issues: the one, whether he is obliged to decide the protest; the other, what that decision should be. His attitude with respect to the first protest, when he refused by his letter of December 20, 1985 to make a decision on it, appears to be that no decision was required because the outcome was inevitable. Under the Act, as amended, it is pro vided inter alia:
14.2 (1) A protest may be made in respect of the inclusion or addition of the name of a person in, or the omission or deletion of the name of a person from, the Indian Register, or a Band List maintained in the Department, within three years after the inclusion or addition, or omission or deletion, as the case may be, by notice in writing to the Registrar, containing a brief statement of the grounds therefor.
(2) A protest may be made under this section in respect of the Band List of a band by the council of the band, any member of the band or the person in respect of whose name the protest is made or his representative.
(5) Where a protest is made to the Registrar under this section, he shall cause an investigation to be made into the matter and render a decision.
The protest adopted by the applicant Band Coun cil on January 21, 1986 comes clearly within this section. It was adopted by the Band Council, and relates to a decision taken within three years prior to that protest, namely on July 31, 1984. Subsec tion 14.2(5) requires that with respect to such a protest, the Registrar must render a decision. Clearly, he may base that decision on findings of fact or of law or both.
It may be that the amendments adopted in 1985 have unalterably confirmed the entitlement to membership of anyone listed on a Band List immediately prior to April 17, 1985 no matter what the circumstances of his or her inclusion in the list might have been. I need not, and should not, attempt to decide that question which is one for the Registrar to make. That conclusion is certainly far from obvious from a reading of the amendments as a whole and it is to be hoped that, whatever decision the Registrar takes, he will articulate a rationale. Once he has made a decision it is subject to appeal to a court pursuant to section 14.3 just as his decisions on such protests were
subject to review (in the nature of an appeal) by a judge pursuant to section 9 of the Indian Act as it stood prior to the recent amendments.
By refusing or failing to give a decision on either of these protests the Registrar is preventing an appeal to a court of his interpretation of the law. I am not able to conclude that Parliament intended such a result. The reasoning of the Registrar would appear to be that if a protest cannot succeed as a matter of law, then no decision need be taken in respect of it. His view that a protest cannot succeed would appear to turn largely on the provi sions of subsection 9(2) of the Act, as amended, which provides as follows:
9....
(2) The names in a Band List of a band immediately prior to April 17, 1985 shall constitute the Band List of that band on April 17, 1985.
It is further provided in paragraph 11(1)(a) as follows:
11. (1) Commencing on April 17, 1985, a person is entitled to have his name entered in a Band List maintained in the Department for a band if
(a) the name of that person was entered in the Band List for that band, or that person was entitled to have his name entered in the Band List for that band, immediately prior to April 17, 1985;
But there is nothing here which says that no protest can be made with respect to the fact of any person being registered on a Band List prior to April 17, 1985. Given the general nature of the right of protest set out in section 14.2 and the specific duty cast upon the Registrar to decide such protests, I can see no reason why I should read into those requirements an exception with respect to the protests relating to inclusion in a Band List prior to April 17, 1985. If the respond ent is correct, such protests are doomed to failure. But a right of appeal does not disappear just because it has no possibility for success.
I shall therefore order the Registrar to render a decision forthwith with respect to the protest adopted by the applicant in its resolution of Janu- ary 21, 1986.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
(1) The respondent Registrar shall render a decision with respect to the protest of the applicant made on January 21, 1986 against the addition to the Ermineskin Band List of the respondents, Ray- mond John Quinn, Laura Rowan Quinn, Nadine Rae Quinn, Raymond Quinn, Virgel Shawn Quinn and Bonita Cheryl Quinn; and
(2) The applicant is entitled to its costs from the respondent Registrar. No costs to or from the other respondents.
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